The Effects of Internal Audit Report Type and Reporting Relationship on Internal Auditors\u27 Judgments by Boyle, Douglas M.
Kennesaw State University
DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University
Dissertations, Theses and Capstone Projects
4-1-2012
The Effects of Internal Audit Report Type and
Reporting Relationship on Internal Auditors'
Judgments
Douglas M. Boyle
Kennesaw State University, boyled2@scranton.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/etd
Part of the Accounting Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Dissertations, Theses and Capstone Projects by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University.
Recommended Citation
Boyle, Douglas M., "The Effects of Internal Audit Report Type and Reporting Relationship on Internal Auditors' Judgments" (2012).
Dissertations, Theses and Capstone Projects. Paper 505.
   
 
 
THE EFFECTS OF INTERNAL AUDIT REPORT TYPE AND REPORTING 
RELATIONSHIP ON INTERNAL AUDITORS’ JUDGMENTS 
by 
Douglas M. Boyle 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation 
 
 
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the  
Degree of 
Doctorate of Business Administration 
In the 
Coles College of Business 
Kennesaw State University 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kennesaw, GA 
2012 
  
   
 
 
Copyright by 
Douglas M. Boyle 
2012 
  
c;~Ies _So~~e. o~ Busin~_~s 
Doctor of Business Administration 
Dissertation Defense: March 26, 2012 
DBA Candidate: Doug Boyle 
The content and format of the dissertation are appropriate and acceptable for the awarding of 
the degree of Doctor of Business Administration. 
Dana R. Hermanson 
1st Committee Member {Chair) 
Dinos Eminent Scholar Chair of Private Enterprise 
Director of Research - Corporate Governance Center 
Professor of Accounting g 
School of Accountancy 1/ / 
Kennesaw State University Signature: (._ c~---
Todd DeZoort, Ph.D., CFE 
2nd Committee Member 
Professional Advisory Board Fellow 
Professor of Accounting 
Culverhouse School of Accountancy 
University of Alabama 
Divesh Sharma, Ph.D 
Dissertation Reader 
Professor of Accounting 
School of Accountancy 
Signature:·~ 
Kennesaw State University Signature: 
Neal P. Mero, Ph.D 
Executive Director, Coles College DBA Program 
Professor of Management 
Department of Management and Entrepreneurship 
Kennesaw State University Signature: 
Charles J. Amlaner, Jr., D. Phil 
Vice President for Research and 
Dean of Graduate College 
Kennesaw State University Signature: 
   
iv 
 
ACKOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 I would like to thank my family for their support. Laura (my fiancée) made sure 
that I kept my sanity during a time of great change in my life. She was always most 
understanding, supportive, and strong. I am grateful for the way she changed my life. My 
two daughters, Emma and Sarah, have been a constant source of inspiration. This 
transition has enabled me to spend much more quality time with them and enjoy being a 
dad. One time during the program, I heard them discussing “why is dad still in school, he 
must not learn very quickly”. I think they now understand that I am almost done with 
school. I would like to thank my parents for instilling in me my competitive drive, strong 
work ethic, and values. My parents provided me with a safe environment to experiment, 
learn, and succeed. I would like to dedicate my dissertation to them. 
I want to thank all of the faculty and speakers who participated in the program. 
They are truly world-class researchers, teachers, and outstanding people. In addition, 
thanks to my colleagues who served as an ongoing source of support. Having been part of 
such a motivated, experienced, and talented group of outstanding people was a gift.  
I want to especially thank Dr. Dana Hermanson for not only serving in the role of 
my dissertation chair, but for also being an outstanding mentor, research partner, and 
friend. During my executive career, I wish I had someone like Dana by my side for 
guidance and counsel. He flawlessly bridges the gap between academia and practice – a 
rare talent. He is not only a world-class researcher and teacher, but he is also a person 
with high values who truly enjoys what he does. I once heard Dana say “I have the best 
   
v 
 
job in the world”. That level of commitment shows in his work. I agree, we do have the 
best jobs in the world. I look forward to continuing to work with Dana in the future.  
My deepest gratitude goes to Dr. Todd DeZoort. His prior research was the 
inspiration for my dissertation. In addition, I want to thank him for his professionalism 
and insights. I was honored to work with him and hope to continue our collaboration into 
the future.  
I would like to thank Dr. Divesh Sharma for his most comprehensive review of 
my dissertation. His outstanding feedback significantly improved the quality of the study. 
Dr. Neal Mero was pivotal to my success in the program. He mentored me prior 
to attending Kennesaw State University. Since that time, I have grown to respect and 
admire him. Neal always ensured that the program was focused on establishing and 
maintaining the highest level of quality. In my opinion, Neal’s leadership was critical to 
establishing and maintaining the high quality brand that our program deserves.  
Dr. Joe Hair’s reputation in academia is unsurpassed. He was always able to 
instill confidence in us and in the program. Joe did an outstanding job at making complex 
methods understandable and providing clear textbooks and supporting slides. Joe gave 
our program instant credibility while at the same time being a down to earth and a fun 
person. I want to thank him for taking the time to work with us.  
I would like to thank Dr. Lance Brouthers for creating a classroom environment 
that challenged us to think a differently about the world and macro issues. Lance’s 
perspective was always most entertaining and thought provoking. I fully appreciated his 
style, intelligence, and perspectives. I wish I could have worked with him more in the 
program.  
   
vi 
 
Finally, I would like to thank the KSU Center for Internal Auditing, led by Dr. 
Rich Clune, for providing me with feedback on the instrument and working with me to 
obtain the participants needed to complete the study, as well as the Atlanta Chapter of 
The IIA. I also thank The IIA Research Foundation for their financial support. 
 
 
  
   
vii 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
THE EFFECTS OF INTERNAL AUDIT REPORT TYPE AND REPORTING 
RELATIONSHIP ON INTERNAL AUDITORS’ JUDGMENTS 
by 
Douglas M. Boyle 
 
This study examines the effects of internal audit reports issued to external 
stakeholders (the public) and internal audit reporting relationship types on internal 
auditors’ judgments. I use a 4 x 2 between-subjects experiment and practicing internal 
auditors as participants. I manipulate internal audit report type at four levels ((1) no 
external report issued by the internal audit function [current state of practice], (2) 
descriptive external report of internal audit activities, (3) assurance external report on the 
internal controls, and (4) a descriptive external report of internal audit activities and an 
assurance external report on the internal controls). Senior level internal audit’s reporting 
relationship is manipulated at two levels (primarily to management or primarily to the 
audit committee chair). I examine the effects of these independent variables on internal 
auditors’ fraud risk and control risk assessments.  
I find that the issuance of an internal audit report (IAR) to external stakeholders 
affects internal auditors’ judgments. Specifically, internal auditors’ fraud risk 
assessments are higher (more conservative) when the IAR is assurance-based or both 
activities and assurance-based than when the report is only activities-based or there is no 
external report. Additionally, the results indicate that when the Chief Audit Executive 
reports primarily to the Audit Committee Chair (as opposed to management), internal 
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auditors’ control risk assessments are higher (more conservative). This relation is 
marginally significant for fraud risk assessments. Overall, there is evidence that internal 
audit report type and reporting relationship each affect internal auditors’ judgments, 
increasing the conservatism of certain risk assessments when accountability to 
stakeholders or the audit committee increases. 
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
 
This study responds to previous calls for research and examines whether 
differences in internal audit report type and internal audit’s reporting relationship have an 
effect on internal auditors’ fraud risk and control risk judgments. The study provides 
insights into influences on internal auditors’ judgments, as well as evidence to advance 
the dialogue on internal audit reports issued externally and optimal internal audit 
reporting channels. 
Specifically, this study examines the effects of internal audit reports issued to 
external stakeholders (the public) and internal audit reporting relationship types on 
internal auditors’ judgments. I use a 4 x 2 between-subjects experiment and practicing 
internal auditors as participants. I manipulate internal audit report type at four levels ((1) 
no external report issued by the internal audit function [current state of practice], (2) 
descriptive external report of internal audit activities, (3) assurance external report on the 
internal controls, and (4) a descriptive external report of internal audit activities and an 
assurance external report on the internal controls). Senior level internal audit’s reporting 
relationship is manipulated at two levels (primarily to management or primarily to the 
audit committee chair). I examine the effects of these independent variables on internal 
auditors’ fraud risk and control risk assessments, tasks that are central to the role of an 
internal audit function (IIA 2010b). 
Previous authors have called for research on internal audit reports and reporting 
channels. For example, Archambeault et al. (2008) call for internal auditors to consider 
             
2 
 
issuing formal, external reports to stakeholders, and they specifically cite the need for 
research on the effects of such external reports on internal auditors’ judgments. Beasley 
et al. (2009) find that many internal audit functions have reporting channels to the audit 
committee and management that are “murky”, raising questions about the party to whom 
internal audit truly is accountable. The Institute of Internal Auditors (2003) calls for 
research on the impacts of different internal audit reporting channels.  
I find that the issuance of an internal audit report (IAR) to external stakeholders 
affects internal auditors’ judgments. Specifically, internal auditors’ fraud risk 
assessments are higher (more conservative) when the IAR is assurance-based or both 
activities and assurance-based than when the report is only activities-based or there is no 
external report. Additionally, the results indicate that when the Chief Audit Executive 
reports primarily to the Audit Committee Chair (as opposed to management), internal 
auditors’ control risk assessments are higher (more conservative). This relation is 
marginally significant for fraud risk assessments. Overall, there is evidence that internal 
audit report type and reporting relationship each affect internal auditors’ judgments, 
increasing the conservatism of certain risk assessments when accountability to 
stakeholders or the audit committee increases. 
When asked about their perceptions of IARs, the participants indicated a moderate 
degree of support for the issuance of an activities-based (descriptive) IAR, citing that 
such a report may provide recognition to the internal audit function (IAF), elevate the 
status of the IAF, improve corporate governance, and enable benchmarking opportunities. 
Participants who did not support the issuance of a descriptive IAR indicated that it may 
provide limited value, may not be consistent with the role of an IAF, may be too 
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costly/time consuming, and may lack required organizational support. Overall, the 
participants believe that the issuance of a descriptive IAR would increase the total IAF 
budget by an average of over 17 percent. 
The participants indicated a modest degree of support for the issuance of an 
assurance-based IAR, citing that such a report may increase responsibility and risk to the 
IAF, may not be consistent with the role of the IAF, may overlap with the external 
auditor’s work, may be costly and require significant time/resources, and represents a 
significant change that may not be supported by the organization. The participants 
indicated the costs associated with issuing such a report would be extremely high, a mean 
of 78 percent (43 percent) of the current IAF budget for public company (non-public 
company) participants. 
The results also reveal that, in actual practice, the balance of internal audit 
reporting for the non-public company participants resides with management, for both 
oversight and budget determination. The balance of oversight for public company 
participants resides equally between management and the audit committee chair 
(consistent with Abbott et al. 2010), and resides primarily with management for budget 
determination. Thus, in actual practice, the participants serve in IAFs with significant 
accountability to management, rather than the audit committee. 
This study has four potential practice implications. First, the results provide 
management and audit committee members with insights into how to design internal 
audit report types and relationship types to promote effective corporate governance. 
These issues are long-standing questions within the practice community, for which 
limited academic research has been performed. Specifically, the findings of the study 
             
4 
 
show that report types and reporting relationships affect internal auditors’ risk 
assessments. Report types and reporting relationship types that increase internal audit’s 
accountability to stakeholders and to the audit committee result in more conservative 
judgments. Second, the study highlights the significant potential costs of externally-
issued IARs, which must be weighed against the expected benefits. Third, in their actual 
organizations, participants serve in IAFs with significant accountability to management, 
rather than the audit committee. Such reporting relationships may impede the 
effectiveness of the IAF, as well as the overall effectiveness of corporate governance, 
given that the internal audit function plays such a pivotal role in the governance process 
(Abbott 2010; Cohen et al. 2004; Gramling et al. 2004). In addition, there may be 
implications for the effectiveness of others within the governance mosaic, such as the 
audit committee and the external auditor who rely on the work of the IAF to fulfill their 
roles. Fourth, the results of this study may be of interest to policy makers, particularly the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, as it governs U.S. public company disclosures. I 
encourage the SEC to carefully consider the costs and benefits of externally-issued IARs, 
especially as this area of research grows.  
Finally, the study has implications for research and theory. The study utilizes 
accountability theory and agency theory to examine a key area of corporate governance. 
In applying these theories in the context of corporate governance, researchers are better 
able to understand how greater accountability of internal auditors may induce greater 
conservatism and monitoring, tenets of agency theory. In addition, the study responds to 
previous calls for academic research and provides a complement to earlier work (Holt 
and DeZoort 2009) that examined the effects of IARs on investors’ judgments. 
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The Institute of Internal Auditors states, “Internal auditing is an independent, 
objective assurance and consulting activity designed to add value and improve an 
organization’s operations. It helps an organization accomplish its objectives by bringing a 
systematic, disciplined approach to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of risk 
management, control, and governance processes” (IIA 2010a). This role requires the 
internal auditor to serve several stakeholders, perform a wide range of duties, and balance 
sometimes-conflicting requirements. This study investigates certain issues (i.e., report 
types, relationship types, fraud risk assessments, and control risk assessments) related to 
the internal audit function (IAF) and its role in governance. Gaining insight into these 
areas is important given the critical role the IAF plays in effective corporate governance 
(see Gramling et al. 2004). Cohen et al. (2004, 136) emphasize the significance of the 
internal audit function as an important part of the corporate governance mosaic and state: 
…governance reforms (i.e., The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the resulting SEC and 
stock exchange regulation) have emphasized the significance of the internal audit 
function as an important part of the governance mosaic. For example, companies 
listed on the NYSE are now required to maintain an internal audit function and 
the audit committees of such companies are required to meet with the internal 
auditors without the presence of management. Increasingly, boards and audit 
committees view internal and external auditors as partners who must work 
together for ensuring the highest quality of financial reports are provided to all 
stakeholders. 
  
The internal auditor is in the unique position of having daily access to the internal 
culture, management, processes, and activities of the organization. This access may 
provide the internal auditor the opportunity to detect corporate governance, risk, or 
control issues in a manner that other actors in the governance mosaic (i.e., external 
auditors, directors) often cannot, based on their distance from the organization. 
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Internal Audit Report 
Given the significant role that the IAF plays in the governance of an organization 
(Cohen et al. 2004; Gramling et al. 2004), it is a potential shortcoming of governance 
design that internal audit continues to be the only key player in the governance mosaic 
not to make disclosures or express assurances that are available to external stakeholders. 
Instead, current governance disclosures and assurances to external stakeholders focus 
only on management, the board and its committees, and the external auditor 
(Archambeault et al. 2008). Internal audit typically does not provide any information 
about its composition, responsibilities, or activities to outside stakeholders, nor does it 
provide any external assurance to stakeholders. However, some have discussed whether 
such disclosure and assurance from the IAF to the external stakeholders would provide 
useful information to the public, while positively affecting the behaviors of the IAF to 
improve the corporate governance of the organization (Archambeault et al. 2008). 
 To address this lack of externally-available information about internal audit, 
previous authors have called for the consideration of an Internal Audit Report (“IAR”) to 
external stakeholders (Holt and DeZoort 2009; Archambeault et al. 2008; Lapides et al. 
2007). This IAR would provide disclosure from the IAF directly to the external 
stakeholders and could address the composition, responsibilities, and activities of the 
IAF, as well as certain forms of assurance. Such information could provide useful 
insights into the role of the IAF in corporate governance.  
To begin to examine whether an IAR provides valuable information to 
stakeholders, Holt and DeZoort (2009) examine the user side of the IAR setting and 
evaluate the extent to which a descriptive IAR affects investor confidence and investment 
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decisions. Their results indicate that participants provided with a descriptive IAR 
(addressing the IAF’s activities) have more confidence in financial reporting reliability 
and assess perceived company oversight effectiveness higher than participants without 
access to a descriptive IAR. The IAR effect on confidence in financial reporting 
reliability is particularly evident for high fraud risk companies. Self-insight results show 
that the IAR is perceived to be as useful as several currently required disclosures, such as 
the Audit Committee Report, Management’s Discussion and Analysis, and 
Management’s Report on Internal Controls. Thus, based on Holt and DeZoort (2009), it 
appears that a descriptive IAR would provide valuable information to external 
stakeholders. 
 Research has not yet addressed any effects of an IAR issued to external 
stakeholders on internal auditors’ judgments. Archambeault et al. (2008, 5-6) cite one of 
the expected advantages of such IARs to be enhanced accountability for internal auditors, 
and they call for research on this issue: 
Interview results provide evidence that supports accountability and increased 
diligence as benefits of IAR disclosure. For example, one internal auditor 
participant suggested that “the report would help address questions about what 
internal audit does… increased transparency may lead to increased quality 
standardization of, and investment in, internal audit activities.” The interviews 
also revealed suggestions that an IAR would provide incentive for management to 
provide more support and access to internal auditors. For example, one internal 
auditor recognized the “potential for increased resource allocation for internal 
audit if such disclosure is made.” Similarly, one policymaker highlighted that 
“management might not want to reveal a lack of support for the internal audit 
function.” One of the audit committee member participants stated that “the net 
benefit of the report would be to hold the internal audit function and management 
to a higher standard of accountability.” [emphasis added] 
 
Later the authors state (p. 10), “While we describe the IAR’s potential to complement 
existing governance disclosures, we emphasize the need for additional research and 
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discussion by policymakers, practitioners, and researchers to further evaluate the merits 
and specify the nature of such disclosure.” The authors also call for cost/benefit research 
on implementing and maintaining an IAR to external stakeholders.  
Based on Archambeault et al. (2008), this study investigates whether the 
provision of an IAR manipulated at four levels (to capture four levels of accountability – 
no external report issued by internal audit [current state of practice], descriptive external 
report of internal audit activities, assurance external report on the internal controls, and a 
descriptive external report of activities and an assurance external report on the internal 
controls) affects internal auditors’ judgments when performing fraud risk and control risk 
assessments.. This study also examines internal auditors’ degree of support for such 
reports and the perceptions of the benefits and costs of such reports. 
Internal Audit Reporting Channel 
Internal auditors typically have a dual reporting structure, where they report to 
both management and the audit committee. This structure varies across organizations and 
often places the internal audit function in a somewhat conflicted position. The Institute of 
Internal Auditors (IIA) calls for that the head of the IAF to receive strategic direction and 
reinforcement from the audit committee chair, while also reporting to management for 
assistance in establishing direction and support, and as an administrative interface (IIA 
2010a). While internal auditors have access to and operate within the organization, they 
are required to provide independent and objective assurance on the effectiveness of the 
risk management, control, and governance processes of the organization as part of their 
role in the governance mosaic (IIA 2010a). The IIA defines independence and objectivity 
as key components of an effective IAF, as stated in The IIA standards and guidance (IIA 
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2010a, 3-4). In addition, The IIA identifies objectivity as one of its four mandatory 
principles under its Code of Ethics (IIA 2010a, 3-4): 
The chief audit executive must report to a level within the organization that 
allows the internal audit activity to fulfill its responsibilities. The chief audit 
executive must confirm to the board, at least annually, the organizational 
independence of the internal audit activity. The internal audit activity must be free 
from interference in determining the scope of internal auditing, performing work, 
and communicating results. Internal auditors must have an impartial, unbiased 
attitude and avoid any conflict of interest. 
 
Internal auditors exhibit the highest level of professional objectivity in gathering, 
evaluating, and communicating information about the activity or process being 
examined. Internal auditors make a balanced assessment of all the relevant 
circumstances and are not unduly influenced by their own interests or by others in 
forming judgments. 
Thus, The IIA recognizes internal audit’s dual reporting role and the potential for the 
IAF’s independence and objectivity to be affected by its reporting structure. While this 
definition of the role of internal audit includes the key stakeholders needed for the 
function to be effective, it creates inherent conflict and accountability confusion, which 
may affect the judgment of the internal auditor. Several academic authors have provided 
additional insight into these issues that illustrate how the IAF’s reporting channels to both 
management and the audit committee could affect the independence of the IAF. 
First, Gramling and Hermanson (2006) discuss the requirement for the IAF to 
serve two roles and offer suggestions to internal auditors on how to add the greatest value 
in this matrix-reporting environment. The first role discussed is to the board for 
governance matters, and the second role is to management, primarily to provide 
consulting services. The authors state (p. 38): “To have the greatest value to the board, 
internal auditors should think of their primary role as a resource to the board and its audit 
committee, and should develop the internal audit function accordingly.” 
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Second, Christopher et al. (2009) identify threats to maintaining the independence 
of the IAF. The most significant threats to independence include the following (p. 200): 
Using the internal audit function as a stepping stone to other positions; having the 
chief executive officer (CEO) or chief finance officer (CFO) approve the internal 
audit function’s budget and provide input for the internal audit plan; and 
considering the internal auditor to be a “partner”, especially when combined with 
other indirect threats.  
 
With respect to the relationship with the audit committee, significant threats 
identified include the IAF not reporting functionally to the audit committee; the 
audit committee not having sole responsibility for appointing, dismissing and 
evaluating IAF leadership; and not having all audit committee members or at least 
one member qualified in accounting.  
 
Third, Beasley et al. (2009) conducted interviews of audit committee members 
and found that internal audit’s reporting relationship with the audit committee and 
management often is “murky”. The authors state (pp. 36-37): “In many cases, the 
oversight of internal audit is shared between the audit committee and management in a 
fairly informal, sometimes contentious manner… Overall, there was a substantial lack of 
clarity in internal audit’s reporting channels… there is significant potential for internal 
audit’s loyalties to be divided as a result of multiple reporting channels (i.e., to the audit 
committee and management).” 
Fourth, Barua et al. (2010) examine audit committee characteristics and 
investment in internal auditing using 181 SEC registrants. The study finds that the 
internal audit budget is positively related to the frequency of audit committee meetings. 
The study also finds that internal audit budget investment is negatively related to the 
presence of auditing experts on the audit committee and audit committee member tenure. 
These findings indicate that the characteristics of the audit committee are associated with 
the budget determination of the IAF.  
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Fifth, using surveys of 134 chief internal auditors from Fortune 1000 firms, 
Abbott et al. (2010) investigated the relationship between audit committee oversight of 
the IAF and the amount of the IAF budget allocated to internal-control-based activities. 
Oversight was measured with a series of questions requesting the participants to indicate 
their level of agreement using a five-point Likert scale: internal audit reports to the audit 
committee, internal audit reports to the Chief Financial Officer, internal audit reports to 
the Chief Executive Officer, the audit committee has authorization to terminate the Chief 
Internal Auditor, the CFO has authorization to terminate the Chief Internal Auditor, the 
CEO has authorization to terminate the Chief Internal Auditor, the audit committee 
determines internal audit’s annual budget, the CFO determines internal audit’s annual 
budget, and the CEO determines internal audit’s annual budget. 
 The study finds a strong positive relationship between increased audit committee 
oversight of the IAF and the amount of the IAF budget allocated to internal-control-based 
activities. In addition, the study finds that the audit committee shares a near-equal 
oversight role with management related to the IAF. When the IAF is resource constrained 
by a budget, the dual reporting channel may cause competing directives from the audit 
committee and management, whereby the audit committee has motivation to support the 
allocation of resources to internal control related activities and management may support 
the allocation of resources to consultative activities.
1
 Thus, Abbott et al.’s (2010) results 
indicate that the IAF’s reporting relationship may affect the allocation of IAF resources.  
                                                 
1
 Also see Carcello et al. (2005), Hermanson and Rittenberg (2003), Quarles (1994), and Pei and Davis 
(1989) for additional discussion of reporting channels.  
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Finally, the Institute of Internal Auditors’ Research Opportunities in Internal 
Auditing (2003) raised the following research questions related to internal auditor 
reporting channels: 
1. Are there inherent conflicts in reporting responsibilities when internal auditors 
report to both the audit committee and to various levels of management?  
2. What is (are) the potential impact(s) of having the IAF report to different 
organizational levels (e.g., board of directors in general, audit committee, the 
CEO, the COO, the CFO)? 
3. Is there an ideal reporting relationship for the IAF? What are the parameters of the 
ideal reporting relationship, and what are the primary determinants of the ideal 
reporting relationship? 
4. What type of internal audit structure enhances the accountability of governmental 
entities? 
5. How can the IAF best increase accountability to various stakeholders? 
These research questions have not yet been extensively investigated, which provides 
further motivation for the current study. Given the sometimes-unclear reporting structure 
for internal audit, it is important to understand the effect that the IAF reporting channel 
has on the judgments of internal auditors.  
The literature I reviewed indicated potential conflicts within the dual reporting 
structure of the IAF between management and the audit committee, which may threaten 
the independence/objectivity of the IAF. There also remain several open research 
questions regarding the potential effects of the IAF’s reporting relationships that will be 
specifically addressed by my study including: 
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1. Does the reporting relationship of the IAF affect the judgments of internal 
auditors when performing fraud and control risk assessments? 
2. Where does the balance of reporting for the IAF currently reside (with 
management or the audit committee chair)? 
3. Which governance player (management or the audit committee) currently 
determines the budget of the IAF?  
Overview of Study 
 
This study investigates the following three issues that have been identified as 
areas for future research and of significant importance to the practice and policy 
formulation of the internal audit function: 
1. The effect of internal audit reports to external stakeholders on internal auditors’ 
fraud risk and control risk assessments, using four manipulated levels of report 
type (no external report issued by internal audit [current state of practice], 
descriptive external report of internal audit activities, assurance external report on 
the internal controls, and a descriptive external report of activities and an 
assurance external report on the internal controls), 
2. Internal auditors’ perceptions of the costs and benefits of externally-issued 
internal audit reports, and 
3. The effect of internal audit’s reporting channels (reporting primarily to the audit 
committee chair and to management) on internal auditors’ fraud risk and control 
risk assessments.  
The study uses a 4 x 2 between-subjects experiment (four report types and two 
relationship types) with 108 practicing internal auditors as participants. The participants 
             
14 
 
were obtained from the membership of three IIA chapters, who received email invitations 
to participate in the study using an online instrument. I find that the issuance of an 
internal audit report (IAR) outside the company affects internal auditors’ judgments. 
Specifically, internal auditors’ fraud risk assessments are higher (more conservative) 
when the IAR is assurance-based or both activities and assurance-based than when the 
report is only activities-based or there is no external report. Additionally, the results 
indicate that when the Chief Audit Executive reports primarily to the Audit Committee 
Chair (as opposed to management), internal auditors’ control risk assessments are higher 
(more conservative). This relation is marginally significant for fraud risk assessments. 
Overall, there is evidence that internal audit report type and reporting relationship each 
affect internal auditors’ judgments, increasing the conservatism of certain risk 
assessments when accountability to stakeholders or the audit committee increases. 
When asked about their perceptions of IARs, the participants indicated a moderate 
degree of support for the issuance of an activities-based (descriptive) IAR, citing that 
such a report may provide recognition to the internal audit function (IAF), elevate the 
status of the IAF, improve corporate governance, and enable benchmarking opportunities. 
Participants who did not support the issuance of a descriptive IAR indicated that it may 
provide limited value, may not be consistent with the role of an IAF, may be too 
costly/time consuming, and may lack required organizational support. Overall, the 
participants believe that the issuance of a descriptive IAR would, on average, increase the 
total IAF annual budget by over 17 percent. 
The participants indicated a modest degree of support for the issuance of an 
assurance-based IAR, citing that such a report may increase responsibility and risk to the 
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IAF, may not be consistent with the role of the IAF, may overlap with the external 
auditor’s work, may be costly and require significant time/resources, and represents a 
significant change that may not be supported by the organization. The participants 
indicated the costs associated with issuing such a report would be extremely high, a mean 
of 78 percent (43 percent) of the current IAF budget for public company (non-public 
company) participants. 
The results also reveal that, in actual practice, the balance of internal audit 
reporting for the non-public participants resides with management, for both oversight and 
budget determination. The balance of oversight for public company participants resides 
equally between management and the audit committee chair (consistent with Abbott et al. 
2010), and resides primarily with management for budget determination. Thus, in actual 
practice, the participants serve in IAFs with significant accountability to management, 
rather than the audit committee. 
This study has four potential practice implications. First, the results provide 
management and audit committee members with insights into how to design internal 
audit report types and relationship types to promote effective corporate governance. 
These issues are long-standing questions within the practice community, for which 
limited academic research has been performed. Specifically, the findings of the study 
show that reporting relationship types and report types affect internal auditors’ risk 
assessments. Report types and reporting relationship types that increase internal audit’s 
accountability to stakeholders and to the audit committee result in more conservative 
judgments. Second, the study highlights the significant potential costs of externally-
issued IARs, which must be weighed against the expected benefits. Third, in their actual 
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organizations, participants serve in IAFs with significant accountability to management, 
rather than the audit committee. Such reporting relationships may impede the 
effectiveness of the IAF, as well as the overall effectiveness of corporate governance, 
given that the internal audit function plays such a pivotal role in the governance process 
(Abbott 2010; Cohen et al. 2004; Gramling et al. 2004). In addition, there may be 
implications for the effectiveness of others within the governance mosaic, such as the 
audit committee and the external auditor who rely on the work of the IAF to fulfill their 
roles. Fourth, the results of this study may be of interest to policy makers, particularly the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, as it governs U.S. public company disclosures. I 
encourage the SEC to carefully consider the costs and benefits of externally-issued IARs, 
especially as this area of research grows.  
Finally, the study has implications for research and theory. The study utilizes 
accountability theory and agency theory to examine a key area of corporate governance. 
In applying these theories in the context of corporate governance, researchers are better 
able to understand how greater accountability of internal auditors may induce greater 
conservatism and monitoring, tenets of agency theory. In addition, the study responds to 
previous calls for academic research and provides a complement to earlier work (Holt 
and DeZoort 2009) that examined the effects of IARs on investors’ judgments.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Accountability 
In the academic literature, “accountability” refers to being answerable to 
audiences for performing up to certain prescribed standards, thereby fulfilling 
obligations, duties, expectations, and other charges (Schlenker et al. 1991; Schlenker and 
Weigold 1989; Schlenker 1986). When people are accountable, they can be made to 
explain and justify their conduct, and their behavior can be scrutinized, judged, and 
sanctioned by audiences (Tetlock 1985, 1992; Semin and Manstead 1983). The board, 
audit committee, internal audit, and external audit serve in the role to scrutinize, judge, 
and sanction on behalf of the external stakeholders, and management serves as an agent 
of the external stakeholders and is the subject of such oversight processes.  
The notion of accountability discussed above is consistent with how 
accountability is implemented in business practice under effective corporate governance. 
However, with several parties (with potentially varying levels of information, 
capabilities, and motivations) exerting accountability over management (with potentially 
its own set of information, capabilities, and motivations) on behalf of a wide range of 
external stakeholders, the application of this notion is complex (see Cohen et al. 2004). 
The “corporate governance mosaic,” as described in Cohen et al. (2004), illustrates the 
complexity that is created by the diverse needs of the wide range of external stakeholder 
groups (which include the courts and legal system, regulators, financial analysts, stock 
exchanges, legislators, and stockholders) and the motivations, capabilities, interactions,
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and information held and sought by the key players in the governance mosaic (which 
include the board, audit committee, internal auditors, and external auditor). Since the 
governance structure described above includes various levels of accountability, which 
ultimately is intended to reside with external stakeholders, formal study of the effects of 
accountability on the judgments of the various players is important to ensure effective 
governance. 
Agency theory (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976) indicates that the agents (in this 
case management) will not always act in the best interests of the principals, thus creating 
a need for monitoring and accountability (see Cohen et al. 2008). Since most 
shareholders cannot directly exercise this accountability, the board and its committees, 
and the internal and external auditors, serve to ensure this accountability is established 
and maintained. Through a complex formal and informal process, the interaction of the 
board of directors, audit committee, internal audit function, external auditor, and 
management attempts to create this accountability to the external stakeholders (see Cohen 
et al. 2004). Corporate governance cannot be effective without this accountability; 
therefore, is it critical to ensure it is established and maintained and does not serve as 
only a ceremonial process, as suggested by institutional theory (Carcello et al. 2011; 
Cohen et al. 2008; Cohen et al. 2004). 
DeZoort et al. (2006) examined the effects of accountability on external auditors’ 
behavior. The study builds on a line of external auditing research examining the effects of 
accountability on auditor behavior (DeZoort et al. 2006, 6-7): “Collectively, these studies 
generally indicate that accountability pressure decreases judgment variability (e.g., 
Ashton 1992; Johnson and Kaplan 1991) and increases judgment conservatism (e.g., 
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Hoffman and Patton 1997; Lord 1992) and effort (e.g., Asare et al. 2000; Chang et al. 
1997; Cloyd 1997; Koonce et al. 1995; Tan 1995).” Of primary relevance to the present 
study is the link between accountability and greater conservatism in judgments. 
The DeZoort et al. (2006) study used a 4 X 2 between-subjects experiment 
involving a series of materiality judgments. The participants were 160 external auditors 
from five public accounting firms. The authors manipulated accountability pressure at 
four levels: (1) anonymity, (2) review, (3) justification, and (4) feedback. They found that 
incremental increases in levels of accountability of the external auditor through audit 
partner review, justification, and feedback resulted in increased judgment conservatism, 
decreased judgment variability, and increased levels of effort when performing planning 
materiality and proposed audit adjustment tasks. The technical backgrounds, experiences, 
and training of external auditors often are similar to those of internal auditors. In this 
study, I expand this line of research to the context of reporting types and relationship 
types of the internal auditor. 
The literature on accountability theory regarding performance ratings from the 
rater’s perspective is also relevant to this study, given that the primary responsibility of 
the internal auditor is to provide feedback on the performance of an organization, its 
management, and its internal controls. This places the internal auditor in the role of a 
rater, similar to one in a performance-rating context. In this role as rater, the internal 
auditor may make varying judgments depending on to whom he/she formally and 
informally reports. Specifically, if the balance of reporting for the internal auditor resides 
with management (a party that supports the reporting of favorable outcomes), the internal 
auditor may feel pressure to report more favorable outcomes, resulting in lower quality 
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ratings. If the balance of reporting resides with the audit committee (a party that supports 
objective reporting), the internal auditor will be operating with no special pressures and 
will provide higher quality ratings.  
Academic research in this area demonstrates that raters who are held accountable 
for their ratings in a motivational context in which there are no special pressures to 
achieve a certain rating outcome will rate more accurately than raters in the same 
motivation context who are not held accountable for their ratings (Mero and Motowidlo 
1995). In addition, the extant literature provides evidence that accountable raters will rate 
more consistently than will non-accountable raters. Prior research also provides evidence 
that when individuals are required to document, report, and justify their ratings to higher 
status or mixed status audiences, they provide more accurate ratings because they are 
made to feel more accountable (Mero et al. 2007).  
Based on accountability theory, both the lack of a report from the internal auditor 
to the external stakeholders and the murky reporting relationship of the internal auditor 
(oftentimes to senior management, who is supposed to be the subject of monitoring) tend 
to reduce the level of accountability of the internal auditor to the ultimate beneficiaries of 
corporate governance, the external stakeholders. These two existing conditions should 
create stronger levels of accountability to management, as that is the group that receives 
reports from the internal auditor and to whom the internal auditor often reports. In this 
context, using accountability theory, the internal auditor will tend to make decisions and 
judgments that are consistent with the views of the audience, which is management. 
Given that internal auditors often have an unclear reporting relationship and in many 
cases are accountable to management, they will be motivated to present themselves as 
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positively as possible to this group and not properly maintain objectivity in their 
assessment. When this occurs, the effectiveness of the player perhaps best positioned to 
detect irregularities in the corporate governance mosaic, internal audit, is diminished. By 
contrast, having internal audit issue reports to external stakeholders and having internal 
audit report primarily to the audit committee instead of management both serve to 
increase internal audit’s accountability to parties favoring more conservative judgments.  
Hypotheses  
Internal Audit Reports 
Currently, the internal auditor does not document, report, or justify his/her ratings 
to the external stakeholders. In this study, I apply accountability theory to the internal 
audit reporting context. I posit that when internal auditors are required to document and 
issue a written report to the external stakeholders, who would represent a higher status 
audience, they may feel/experience greater accountability. Accountability theory predicts 
that issuing an external report will motivate internal auditors to perform their role in a 
manner that is more closely aligned with the interests of those external stakeholders, thus 
resulting in more effective governance. Further, I posit that increasing the level of 
accountability through variations in the content of the external report, should “cause” 
internal auditors’ judgments to become more conservative. External stakeholders prefer 
the controls and financial reporting process of the organization in which they have an 
interest to be conservative (management does not cut corners and takes the governance 
process seriously) in order to produce reliable and accurate information and to safeguard 
assets (see Cohen et al. (2004) for discussion).  
With respect to issuing an IAR to external stakeholders, internal audit 
accountability to external stakeholders increases with the issuance of an activities-based 
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IAR (what the IAF does) versus no external report. In providing descriptive information 
to the external stakeholders, the IAF become more accountable to those stakeholders 
because the function is now subject to review, scrutiny, and feedback. Likewise, an 
assurance-based report (where the IAF provides a conclusion about internal control 
effectiveness) reflects even greater accountability than an activities-based IAR. The 
conclusion reached by the IAF increases the degree of review, scrutiny, and feedback the 
IAF will encounter, thus increasing the degree of accountability. Finally, providing both 
activities and assurance information in the IAR represents the highest level of 
accountability in this study.  
The two prime judgments presented to the participants were fraud risk 
assessments and control risk assessments. While it may be expected that increased levels 
of scrutiny would increase the level of internal audit accountability (and conservatism) 
for all judgments, these two judgments are of particular interest due to the central role 
they play in internal auditing and corporate governance. According to The Institute of 
Internal Auditors’ 2010 Global Survey (IIA 2010b) (which included more than 13,500 
respondents from more than 107 countries), investigation of fraud and evaluation of 
internal controls were both listed within the top five activities performed by internal 
auditors. In addition, these two judgments are related, as poor controls often lead to 
increased risk of fraud (e.g., the fraud triangle) and would be of particular interest to a 
variety of external stakeholders, who can suffer significant damages in fraud cases (e.g., 
Beasley et al. 2010).  
Based on the discussion above, the first set of hypotheses uses accountability 
theory to predict the effect of report type as follows (collectively, internal auditor 
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conservatism is predicted to increase across the levels of (a) no report, to (b) activities-
based IAR, to (c) assurance-based IAR, to (d) activities-based and assurance-based IAR): 
Hypothesis 1A: 
Internal auditors issuing a descriptive activities-based internal audit report to 
external stakeholders will make more conservative judgments when performing 
fraud and control risk assessments than internal auditors issuing no such report. 
Hypothesis 1B: 
Internal auditors issuing an assurance-based internal audit report to external 
stakeholders will make more conservative judgments when performing fraud and 
control risk assessments than internal auditors issuing a descriptive activities-
based report.  
Hypothesis 1C: 
Internal auditors issuing a descriptive activities-based and assurance-based 
internal audit report to external stakeholders will make more conservative 
judgments when performing fraud and control risk assessments than internal 
auditors issuing an assurance-based report.  
Reporting Channel 
Accountability theory also provides a basis for expecting internal audit’s reporting 
channel (primarily to the audit committee or primarily to management) to affect internal 
auditors’ judgments. When decision makers know their audience’s views, they make 
decisions or judgments that are consistent with those views (Klimoski and Inks 1990; 
Tetlock 1985), because as cognitive misers (Taylor and Fisk 1978), people prefer 
decision-making strategies that involve the least effort. Several studies have supported 
the influence of the need for approval (Jones and Wortman 1977; Workman and 
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Lisenmeier 1977) and the motivation of individuals to present themselves as positively as 
possible to those to whom they are accountable (Baumeister 1982; Schlenker 1980).  
In serving in their role as an evaluator of the performance of management, the 
internal audit function typically reports jointly to management and the audit committee 
(Abbott et al. 2010). This situation may affect internal auditors’ rating accuracy, since 
internal auditors (raters) are not held accountable for their ratings to the ultimate 
beneficiary (the external stakeholder) but are operating in a motivational context in which 
there are special pressures to achieve a certain ratings outcome from management.  
Agency theory states that the role of the corporate governance actors (i.e., board 
of directors, audit committee, internal auditor) is to monitor management to prevent 
opportunistic management behavior (Cohen et al. 2008; Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
Thus, it is the role of the audit committee to support judgments that ensure proper 
financial statement reporting and disclosure. Consistent with this role, Haka and Chalos 
(1990) found that audit committees support a higher level of disclosure to external 
stakeholders than does management. DeZoort (1997) found that the audit committees 
indicated that the evaluation of internal control was the most important duty for the 
committee to fulfill. Effective internal controls are designed to ensure accurate financial 
reporting and reduce the risk of fraud. Abbott and Parker (2000) discussed that audit 
committees have a motivation to avoid financial misstatements to protect the reputational 
capital of their members. In addition, the audit committee is subject to potential director 
liability if financial statement fraud is to occur. All of the above studies support the audit 
committee’s preference for conservative judgments relating to financial statement 
reporting and fraud prevention.  
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In addition, audit committees of public companies are required to include a report 
to external stakeholders in the annual proxy statement. According to the SEC, this report 
must include the following (SEC 2000): 
…in the report, the audit committee must state whether the audit committee has: 
(i)  
reviewed and discussed the audited financial statements with management; (ii) 
discussed with the independent auditors the matters required to be discussed by 
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 61, as may be modified or supplemented; 
and (iii) received from the auditors disclosures regarding the auditors' 
independence required by Independence Standards Board Standard No. 1, as may 
be modified or supplemented, and discussed with the auditors the auditors' 
independence 
 
This requirement may further bolster the accountability of the audit committee to the 
external stakeholders and cause the audit committee to favor conservative judgments. 
When the internal auditor primarily reports to the audit committee chair and less 
so to management, under accountability theory, the internal auditor will make decisions 
that support the preferences of the audit committee chair, who favors more conservative 
judgments. The audit committee favors more conservative judgments to protect the 
members’ reputation risk of having improper actions taken by management, avoid 
potential personal liability, and fulfill its responsibility to ensure proper financial 
reporting (see DeZoort et al. 2008). In addition, the annual report issued by the audit 
committee to the external stakeholders may increase the audit committee’s accountability 
to the external stakeholders.  
In terms of the reporting channel within the organization, if the internal auditor is 
more closely aligned with the audit committee chair, a governance entity, than with 
management, internal auditor judgments should be more consistent with a conservative 
governance focus, which aligns with both accountability theory and agency theory. If the 
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internal auditor is more closely aligned with management, the internal auditor’s 
judgments should be more consistent with management’s views (less conservative). The 
second hypothesis applies accountability theory to predict the effect of reporting 
relationship type on internal auditor’s judgments as follows:  
 Hypothesis 2: 
Internal auditors primarily reporting to the audit committee chair will make more 
conservative judgments when performing fraud and control risk assessments than 
internal auditors primarily reporting to management.  
Research Questions 
The study also includes survey questions to gather perception data from the 
internal auditors regarding the potential costs and benefits of issuing IARs. In addition, 
the instrument gathers data as to where the participants’ actual internal audit function 
reports so as to gain insights into the current balance of reporting and to determine if the 
actual reporting relationship has an effect on the responses in the study. The research 
questions related to this survey include: 
1. What is the level of IAF support for the issuance of an activities-based IAR to 
external stakeholders? 
a. What are the perceived advantages and disadvantages to issuing such a report? 
b. What would be the perceived cost of issuing such a report? 
2. What is the level of IAF support for the issuance of an assurance-based IAR to 
external stakeholders? 
a. What are the perceived advantages and disadvantages to issuing such a report? 
b. What would be the perceived cost of issuing such a report? 
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3. Where does the balance of reporting for oversight currently reside within the 
respondents’ IAFs? 
4. Where does the balance of reporting for budget determination currently reside for 
the respondents’ IAFs? 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
Experimental Design and Case Development 
The experimental materials were composed of an informed consent, followed by a 
brief case study that included sections for company and industry background, financial 
performance, management and compensation, audit committee and external auditor, and 
internal controls, with 8 different versions – for each of the 4 report types and each of the 
2 relationship types (4 x 2 between-subjects design).  
The base case materials represented a mid-sized public company that has a 
competent management team and historically has an effective governance structure and 
results that are in line with industry performance. In addition, the company historically 
had clean audit opinions on its financial statements from a reputable external audit firm 
(the company is not an accelerated filer, so there is no external audit opinion on internal 
control over financial reporting
2
), and management compensation is comparable with 
industry benchmarks.  
The initial case materials were developed after performing a comprehensive 
review of the accounting literature on the topics of IAF report types (e.g., Holt and 
DeZoort 2009; Archambeault et al. 2008) and reporting relationship types (e.g., Abbott et 
al. 2010; Beasley et al. 2009). In addition, I reviewed relevant best practices and guidance 
from The IIA and publicly filed external audit reports. My dissertation committee 
reviewed these initial case materials. Feedback was provided and incorporated into the 
                                                 
2
 This design characteristic makes the IAF’s role more prominent and avoids confounding with a report 
from the external auditor under SOX Section 404 (b). 
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materials. In addition, four other academics with expertise in the area (including one who 
is very active in The IIA and has significant experience in practice) took the instrument 
and provided valuable feedback, which was incorporated into the final version of the 
cases.  
The most significant feedback provided related to the ensuring that the 
manipulations were reasonable and would be understandable to practitioners, since some 
of the conditions contained concepts and ideas that are not consistent with current 
practice. For example, the notion of the internal audit function providing various reports 
to external stakeholders is currently not found in practice. Since an IAR does not exist, 
extensive design work needed to be performed to select the scope, foundation, format, 
and content for such a report. In order to accomplish this task, research was performed on 
current internal audit reports (issued internally), including the reporting standards and 
guidelines set by The Institute of Internal Auditors, as well as a review of the various 
reports and requirements for external auditor reporting. I also adapted material from 
Archambeault et al. (2008) related to activities-based reports. 
Table 1 summarizes the 4 x 2 design that used four levels of internal audit report 
and two levels of internal audit reporting relationship. This design creates eight cells. 
Similar studies in accounting have secured approximately 15 responses per cell (e.g., 
DeZoort et al. 2003a, 2003b). In this study, the goal was to secure approximately 15 
completed instruments per cell, for a total of approximately 120 participants (see the 
Results section for discussion of power and effect size).  
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TABLE 1 
4 X 2 Experimental Design and Expected Cell Sizes 
 
 Report Type 1 
No IAR 
(represents the 
current 
practice) 
Report Type 2 
Internal auditors 
issue a descriptive 
activities-based 
internal audit 
report to external 
stakeholders 
Report Type 3 
Internal auditors 
issue an 
assurance-based 
internal audit 
report to external 
stakeholders 
Report Type 4 
Internal auditors 
issue a 
descriptive 
activities-based 
and assurance-
based internal 
audit report to 
external 
stakeholders 
Relationship Type 1 
Head of IAF 
effectively reports to 
senior management 
(CFO) 
15 participants 
 
15 participants 15 participants 15 participants 
Relationship Type 2 
Head of IAF 
effectively reports to 
the AC chair 
15 participants 15 participants 15 participants 15 participants 
 
The online instrument was designed and administered in Qualtrics and was 
accessed by invited participants via an online link that was sent to them in an email 
request. The participants were active senior level internal audit professionals. I initially 
used the Atlanta Chapter of The IIA, which is a very large chapter (approximately 1,200 
members) and later included two smaller chapters of The IIA (approximately 500 
members for both) to reach the required number of participants. The IIA sent the 
experiment link along with a request letter via email. In total, three requests (included the 
initial one) were sent to the participants. Please see Appendices 1 for samples of request 
emails. The instrument included a total of 46 items; however, each participant was 
presented only a subset of those items depending on the cell to which they were randomly 
assigned (see Appendices 2).  
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The instrument was submitted to the Institutional Review Boards at the University 
of Scranton, Kennesaw State University, and The University of Alabama. Feedback from 
these boards was incorporated into the instrument, and the final version was approved. 
Experimental Task 
The participants were first provided the informed consent, followed by the base 
case information. All participants were required to acknowledge acceptance of the 
informed consent in order to continue with the instrument. The participants were then 
randomly assigned to one of the two reporting relationships and presented with that 
information. Next, one of the four report types was randomly presented.  
After reading the report type, the participants were all presented the same 
information regarding a system conversion and the related results of interim control 
testing performed by the internal audit department. These results indicated a higher than 
expected error rate in a key control in the revenue cycle.  
The participants were then asked to make six judgments, all of which represent 
dependent variables (fraud risk assessment and control risk assessment, which are the 
primary dependent variables; followed by testing hours, justification to the CFO, 
experience level of staff, and comfort level with the CFO, which are secondary dependent 
variables that are examined in an additional analysis section). The participants were then 
asked to complete two manipulation check questions (one for the relationship type 
manipulation and one for the report type manipulation), followed by questions to assess 
how realistic and understandable the case was, their support level and related cost 
estimate for the various report types, demographic and control data, and to what degree 
they report in practice to management and the audit committee in their organizations. The 
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instrument ended with an invitation to participate in a gift card drawing. The flow of the 
Qualtrics instrument is outlined in Table 2 on the following page. 
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           TABLE 2 
    Instrument Flow 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Instructions and Informed Consent 
Base Case Information 
 
Reporting Relationship 
Manipulation 1:  
Primarily Report to the CFO 
 
Reporting Relationship 
Manipulation 2:  
Primarily Report to the AC 
 
Report 
Type 1: 
No 
Report 
 
Report 
Type 2: 
Descriptive 
Report 
 
Report 
Type 3: 
Assurance 
Report 
 
Report 
Type 4: 
Descriptive 
/Assurance  
 
Report 
Type 1: 
No 
Report 
 
Report 
Type 2: 
Descriptive 
Report 
 
Report 
Type 3: 
Assurance 
Report 
 
Report 
Type 4: 
Descriptive
/Assurance  
 
System Conversion & Related 
Internal Audit Interim Control 
Testing Results 
 
Fraud Risk Judgment 
 
Survey Questions – Who They 
Report to in Practice 
 
Control Risk Judgment 
 
Testing Hours Judgment 
 
Justification to CFO Judgment 
 
Experience Level Judgment 
 
Comfort Level to CFO 
Judgment 
 
Manipulation Checks  
 
Survey Question – Support and 
Cost of Report Types 
 
Survey Question – Realistic and 
Understandable  
 
Demographic and Control Data 
 
Invitation to Drawing 
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The two primary judgment tasks were a fraud risk assessment and a control risk 
assessment, fundamental assessments of the risks considered by the internal auditor. The 
fraud risk assessment question instructed the participants to indicate their opinion as to 
the level of financial statement fraud risk associated with the revenue cycle for the given 
fiscal year, based only on the information presented in the case. The control risk question 
instructed the participants to indicate their opinion as to the level of control risk 
associated with the revenue cycle for the given fiscal year, based only on the information 
presented in the case. These judgments were measured on a sliding scale from 0 to 100 (0 
represents low risk, 50 represents moderate risk, and 100 represents high risk). This type 
of scale is common for these types of studies in the accounting literature (e.g., DeZoort et 
al. 2003a, 2003b, 2008).  
In terms of the secondary judgments, the judgment made by the participants for 
the testing hours was measured on a sliding scale from -50 to 50 (-50 represents 
significantly fewer hours this year, 0 represents the same amount of hours, and 50 
represents significantly more hours this year). The question instructed the participants to 
indicate how many hours they would expect to spend on the revenue cycle control 
testing during the current year-end internal audit as compared to the prior fiscal year-end 
audit. The judgment made by the participants for the importance of justification to the 
CFO was measured on a sliding scale from 0 to 100 (0 represents not at all important, 50 
represents moderately important, and 100 represents very important). The question 
instructed the participants to indicate how important it would be to justify to the Chief 
Financial Officer the audit hours they have budgeted to audit internal control over the 
revenue cycle. 
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The judgment made by the participants for the experience level of assigned staff 
was measured on a sliding scale from -50 to 50 (-50 represents significantly less 
experience this year, 0 represents the same amount of experience, and 50 represents 
significantly more experience this year). The question instructed the participants to 
indicate the experience level of the staff they would assign to the revenue cycle control 
testing for the current year-end internal audit as compared to the prior fiscal year-end 
audit. 
The judgment made by the participants for the comfort level of reporting the 
control testing findings to the CFO was measured on a sliding scale from -50 to 50 (-50 
represents very uncomfortable, 0 represents neutral, and 50 represents very 
comfortable). The question instructed the participants to indicate how comfortable they 
would be in reporting the preliminary internal control deficiency findings (18% 
exceptions) to the Chief Financial Officer. 
Finally, sliding scales from 0 – 100 (0 represents very unrealistic/very difficult to 
understand, 50 represents moderately realistic/understandable, and 100 represents very 
realistic/understandable) were used to measure how realistic and understandable the case 
was to the participants.  
Independent Variables 
The study includes independent variables for the various report types (REPORT 
TYPE) and relationship types (REPORTING RELATIONSHIP). The report types 
include four levels of internal audit reports: 
Type 1 (NO REPORT):  
No formal reporting from the internal auditor to the public (external 
stakeholders). This represents the existing state in practice today.  
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Type 2 (DESCRIPTIVE REPORT):  
A written report from the internal auditor to the public describing the 
composition, responsibilities, and activities of the IAF as described in 
Archambeault et al. (2008). As part of the reporting process, this report is 
to be presented, discussed, and scrutinized by the audit committee prior to 
its presentation to the public. This report is currently not used in practice. 
This report represents an increased level of internal audit accountability 
from Type 1 to both the external stakeholders and the audit committee. 
Type 3 (ASSURANCE REPORT): 
A written report from the internal auditor to the public including 
describing certain assurances from the internal auditor on internal control 
effectiveness. These assurances are similar to the ones provided by the 
company CFO and CEO under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Section 302. As 
part of the reporting process, this report is to be presented, discussed, and 
scrutinized by the audit committee prior to its presentation to the public. 
This report is currently not used in practice. This report represents an 
increased level of internal audit accountability from Type 2 to both the 
external stakeholders and the audit committee.  
Type 4 (DESCRIPTIVE AND ASSURANCE REPORT):  
A written report from the internal auditor to the public describing the 
composition, responsibilities, and activities of the IAF as described in 
Archambeault et al. (2008). In addition, the report includes certain 
assurances from the internal auditor on internal control effectiveness. 
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These assurances are similar to the ones provided by the company CFO 
and CEO under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Section 302. As part of the 
reporting process, this report is to be presented, discussed, and scrutinized 
by the audit committee prior to its presentation to the public. This report is 
currently not used in practice. This report will represent an increased level 
of internal auditor accountability from Type 3 to both the external 
stakeholders and the audit committee.  
The study includes two IAF reporting relationship types, each representing 
independent variables in the model as follows: 
Type 1 (ACCOUNTABLE SENIOR MANGEMENT):  
The head of the IAF has a formal reporting relationship with the Audit 
Committee Chair (ACC) and senior management (specifically the CFO) 
with the CFO taking a much more active role than the ACC. This 
reporting relationship type includes the dual reporting structure as 
described in the Institute of Internal Auditors’ best practices (IIA 2010a); 
however, the much more active CFO oversight role is not consistent with 
the recommended guidance. This type of oversight role for the CFO has 
been identified to exist in practice as discussed in Beasley et al. (2009).  
The head of the IAF discussed topics with the CFO on a frequent 
basis and receives feedback and direction on the scope, timing, and 
management of the IAF. Prior to the ACC’s formal approval of the 
charter, risk assessment, and audit plan for the internal audit department, 
the CFO reviews these materials and provides feedback and an informal 
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approval. The head of the IAF provides direct communication to the CFO 
on the results of the internal audit activities or other matters determined to 
be necessary, including in private meetings. In addition, the head of the 
IAF meets with the CFO in preparation for the quarterly audit committee 
meetings. 
The CFO can significantly influence the head of the IAF’s annual 
performance rating, compensation adjustment, and future career 
advancement within the organization. The annual budget for the IAF is 
largely shaped by discussions between the head of the IAF and the CFO. 
The CFO and ACC also discuss the head of the IAF’s performance and 
internal budget with each other, ultimately leading to formal audit 
committee approval.  
The head of the IAF discusses topics with the ACC on a quarterly 
basis, primarily related to the audit committee meeting. In preparation for 
these meetings, the CAE and the ACC discuss the key activities performed 
by the internal audit function since the last meeting and any related 
findings that are deemed material. In practice, the ACC primarily acts as a 
point person between the internal audit department and the audit 
committee.  
Type 2 (ACCOUNTABLE AUDIT COMMITTEE CHAIR):  
The head of the IAF truly reports to the audit committee chair and works 
closely with this person throughout the year. This report more closely 
reflects the key components noted in the Institute of Internal Auditors’ 
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best practice reporting structure (IIA 2010a). In this relationship type, the 
head of the IAF has a reporting relationship with the ACC and the CFO, 
with the ACC taking a much more active oversight role than the CFO. It 
was important to include the dual reporting component in both relationship 
types to make the case consistent with the Institute of Internal Auditors’ 
best practice reporting structure and what occurs in practice.  
The head of the IAF discusses topics with the ACC on a frequent 
basis and receives feedback and direction on the scope, nature, timing, and 
management of the activities of the IAF. The ACC approves the charter, 
risk assessment, and audit plan for the IAF. The head of the IAF provides 
direct communication to the ACC on the results of the IAF activities or 
other matters determined to be necessary, including in private meetings. In 
addition, the head of the IAF meets with the ACC in preparation for and 
during the quarterly audit committee meetings. 
The ACC ultimately determines the annual performance rating, 
compensation adjustment, and future career advancement of the 
participant within the organization. The annual budget for the IAF is based 
on discussions between the head of the IAF and the ACC. The ACC may 
solicit feedback from the CFO to aid in the assessment of the head of the 
IAF’s performance and the determination of the internal audit function’s 
budget. 
The head of the IAF discusses topics with the CFO on quarterly 
basis. During this discussion, the head of the IAF communicates to the 
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CFO the direction and support needed from the finance function to 
execute the IAF annual audit plan. In practice, the CFO primarily acts as 
an administrative point person between the IAF and the finance 
organization.  
In addition to the manipulated independent variables, I consider several potential 
control variables, including participants’ gender, years of professional experience, years 
of experience as an internal auditor, title, certification status (CIA, CPA, CMA, and 
CFE), educational status, industry, company size, and perceptions of the case.  
Dependent Variables 
In this study, I use two primary dependent variables and four additional secondary 
variables. The two primary variables are complex tasks that represent a significant degree 
of judgment and are at the core of internal audit’s responsibilities (IIA 2010b). These 
variables are of central interest to the study and are a fraud risk assessment and a control 
risk assessment. The secondary variables encompass tasks of interest; however, they do 
not reflect the same degree of judgment or complexity as the primary variables and are 
included in the study to gain additional insights into the primary complex judgments.  
Primary Variable 1: Fraud risk assessment (FRAUD RISK) 
The participants were asked to assess the risk related to a potential fraud 
occurring at the company in the revenue cycle as follows: 
Based only on the information presented in the case materials, 
please slide the below bar to indicate your opinion as to the level 
of financial statement fraud risk associated with the revenue cycle 
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for this fiscal year (0 represents low risk, 50 represents moderate 
risk, and 100 represents high risk). 
Primary Variable 2: Control risk assessment (CONTROL RISK)  
The participants were asked to assess the risk of in the internal controls 
not detecting a material error in the revenue cycle as follows: 
Based only on the information presented in the case materials, 
please slide the below bar to indicate your opinion as to the level 
of control risk associated with the revenue cycle for this fiscal year 
(0 represents low risk, 50 represents moderate risk, and 100 
represents high risk). 
Secondary Variable 1: Control testing hours (TESTING HOURS)  
The participants were asked to assess how many hours of control testing 
they would budget to perform compared with the prior year budget as 
follows: 
Based only on the information presented in the case materials, 
please slide the below bar to indicate how many hours would you 
expect to spend on the revenue cycle control testing during 
the current year-end internal audit as compared to the prior fiscal 
year-end audit (-50 represents significantly fewer hours this year, 0 
represents the same amount of hours, and 50 represents 
significantly more hours this year).  
Secondary Variable 2: Level of justification to the CFO (CFO JUSTIFICATION) 
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The participants were asked to assess how important it would be for them 
to justify the hours they budgeted to the CFO as follows: 
Based only on the information presented in the case materials, 
please slide the below bar to indicate how important it would be to 
justify to the Chief Financial Officer the audit hours you have 
budgeted to audit internal control over the revenue cycle (0 
represents not at all important, 50 represents moderately important, 
and 100 represents very important).  
Secondary Variable 3: Experience level of assigned staff (STAFF 
EXPERIENCE)  
The participants were asked to assess what level of experience they would 
assign to the control testing as follows:  
Based only on the information presented in the case materials, 
please slide the below bar to indicate the experience level of the 
staff you would assign to the revenue cycle control testing 
for the current year-end internal audit as compared to the prior 
fiscal year-end audit (-50 represents significantly less 
experience this year, 0 represents the same amount of experience, 
and 50 represents significantly more experience this year).  
Secondary Variable 4: Comfort level with the CFO (CFO COMFORT) 
The participants were asked to assess how comfortable they would be in 
reporting the preliminary audit findings to the CFO as follows: 
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Based only on the information presented in the case materials, 
please slide the below bar to indicate how comfortable you 
would be in reporting the preliminary internal control deficiency 
findings (18% exceptions) to the Chief Financial Officer (-50 
represents very uncomfortable, 0 represents neutral, and 50 
represents very comfortable).  
Control Variables 
In this study, I consider several potential covariates and fixed effects that may 
serve as control variables, including (coding details for variables actually used are 
discussed further in the Results section below): 
 Gender (dummy variable). 
 Total Professional Experience (measured in years). 
 Professional Experience as an Internal Auditor (measured in 
years). 
 Title (categorical variable for different titles). 
 Industry Segment (consulting, government, public accounting, 
public company, private for profit, not for profit, other) (dummy 
variables). 
 Revenue of Company (categories based on revenues in dollars). 
 Professional Certifications (CPA, CIA, CFA, CFE, CMA) (dummy 
variables). 
 Education (dummy variables for different levels). 
 Realistic Case (0 – 100 scale). 
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 Understandable Case (0 – 100 scale). 
Model 
Based on the above discussion of independent, dependent, and control variables, I 
use the following MANCOVA model to test my hypotheses (followed by individual 
ANCOVAs for fraud risk and control risk separately): 
(FRAUD RISK, CONTROL RISK) = f (REPORT TYPE
1
, REPORTING 
RELATIONSHIP TYPE
2
, REPORT TYPE X RELATIONSHIP TYPE, 
Control Variables
3
) 
1 
NO REPORT, DESCRIPTIVE REPORT, ASSURANCE REPORT, 
DESCRIPTIVE AND ASSURANCE REPORT 
2
ACCOUNTABLE CFO, ACCOUNTABLE AUDIT COMMITTEE CHAIR 
3 
I consider variables including GENDER, TOTAL EXPERIENCE, INTERNAL 
AUDIT EXPERIENCE, TITLE, INDUSTRY SEGMENT, REVENUE, 
CERTIFICATIONS, EDUCATION, REALISTIC, UNDERSTANDABLE. 
Survey Questions 
After the experiment was concluded, the study included a series of survey 
questions. These questions provide additional insight into the topic of reporting 
relationships and report types as they relate to the internal auditor. In addition, the 
questions provide practical insights, such as those related to implementation and cost of 
IARs. The questions include: 
1. Some have called for internal audit departments to provide an annual 
written report to external stakeholders that includes descriptive 
information about the internal audit function such as its composition, 
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responsibilities, accountability, activities, and resources. Please 
indicate by sliding the bar below, your personal level of support for 
such an external report (0 represents no support, 50 represents 
moderate support, and 100 represents full support).  
a. Measured on a sliding scale from 0 to 100. 
b. Please explain your rationale. 
2. Please indicate by sliding the bar below, how much you believe it 
would cost for your internal audit department to issue an annual report 
to external stakeholders that provides descriptive information about the 
internal audit function such as its composition, responsibilities, 
accountability, activities, and resources. (Please state the cost estimate 
as a percentage of your current total annual internal audit budget).  
a. Measured using a sliding scale from 0% to 300%.3  
3. Some have called for internal audit departments to provide an annual 
written report to external stakeholders that provides positive assurance 
on the effectiveness of internal control in areas that have historically 
deemed to be material and of higher risk. Please indicate by sliding the 
bar below, your personal level of support for such an external report (0 
represents no support, 50 represents moderate support, and 100 
represents full support). 
a. Measured using a sliding scale from 0 to 100.  
b. Please explain your rationale. 
                                                 
3
 The 300% endpoint for the scale was determined based on feedback from an academic reviewer with 
significant experience in the practice of internal auditing. This was an increase from the original endpoint 
of 100% to recognize the possibility of a very large effect on the IAF budget. 
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4. Please indicate by sliding the bar below, how much you believe it 
would cost for your internal audit department to issue an annual report 
to external stakeholders that provides positive assurance on the 
effectiveness of internal control in areas that have historically deemed 
to be material and of higher risk. (Please state the cost estimate as a 
percentage of your current total annual internal audit budget).  
a. Measured using a sliding scale from 0% to 300%. 
5. Please indicate by sliding the bar below, the degree to which 
management and the audit committee actively oversee the 
Internal Audit Department in your organization (0 represents oversight 
is provided almost exclusively by management, 50 represents equal 
oversight by management and the audit committee, and 100 represents 
oversight is provided almost exclusively by the audit committee).  
a. Measured on a sliding scale from 0 to 100.  
6. Please indicate by sliding the bar below, which group has the 
greatest influence over the determination of the Internal Audit 
Department’s budget in your organization (0 represents it is almost 
exclusively influenced by management, 50 represents it is 
equally influenced by management and the audit committee, and 100 
represents it is almost exclusively influenced by the audit committee).  
a. Measured on a sliding scale from 0 to 100.  
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Participants 
The study’s participants were active senior level internal audit professionals. I 
initially used the Atlanta Chapter of The IIA, which is a very large chapter 
(approximately 1,200 members) and later included two smaller chapters of The IIA 
(approximately 500 members for both) to reach the required number of participants. 
Since this study required the participants to make some complex judgments, I needed to 
ensure the population primarily included participants with a high level of experience 
(e.g., typically 5 plus years). The IIA sent the experiment to the following groups from 
their membership database:  
 Chief Audit Executives, 
 Directors of Auditing,  
 Audit Managers,  
 Audit Staff,  
 IT Audit Directors,  
 IT Audit Managers,  
 IT Audit Staff,  
 Corporate Management, and  
 Audit Committee Members.4 
The individuals in these groups were sent an email invitation to participate in the 
study from the President of their related IIA chapter. In total, three requests (included the 
initial one) were sent to the participants. Please see Exhibit I for samples of request 
emails. As of January 18, 2012, I received 152 fully completed experiments, resulting in 
                                                 
4
 Audit staff, IT audit staff, corporate management, and audit committee members are not part of our main 
target group, and we had very few usable responses from such individuals (n = 10). As noted below, 
respondent title and years of internal audit experience are not associated with the dependent variables. In 
addition, if I delete all observations with such “other titles” or no title indicated, the MANCOVA results (n 
= 96) are consistent with those in Table 8 below, except that PUBLIC COMPANY becomes significant (p 
= 0.0292). 
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a response rate of 13% (which is comparable to other online instruments sent to internal 
auditors, e.g., Beasley et al. (2005)). The mean completion time for the experiment was 
45.1 minutes. The fully completed responses for each of the eight cells in the 4 X 2 
experimental design are shown in Table 3 below: 
TABLE 3 
Fully Completed Experiments 
 
 Report Type 1 
No IAR 
(represents the 
current 
practice) 
Report Type 2 
Internal auditors 
issue a descriptive 
activities-based 
internal audit 
report to external 
stakeholders 
Report Type 3 
Internal auditors 
issue an 
assurance-based 
internal audit 
report to external 
stakeholders 
Report Type 4 
Internal auditors 
issue a 
descriptive 
activities-based 
and assurance-
based internal 
audit report to 
external 
stakeholders 
Relationship Type 1 
Head of IAF 
effectively reports to 
senior management 
(CFO) 
21 participants 
 
15 participants 16 participants 30 participants 
Relationship Type 2 
Head of IAF 
effectively reports to 
the AC chair 
17 participants 16 participants 14 participants 23 participants 
 
  
49 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4: DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
Manipulation Checks 
 All of the 152 participants were asked two multiple-choice questions to evaluate 
the effectiveness of the manipulations in the case. The first question focused on the 
reporting relationship manipulation as follows: 
Q23 – Manipulation Check – Reporting Relationship  
 
In this case, who most actively oversees the Internal Audit Department?  
 
 Chief Financial Officer (CFO)  
 Audit Committee Chair (ACC)  
The second question focused on the report type manipulation as follows:  
 
Q24 – Manipulation Check – Report Type  
 
In this case, your Internal Audit Department produces the following voluntary 
(not required) reports to external stakeholders: 
 
 No reporting to external stakeholders – all internal audit reports are for 
internal use only.  
 An overall annual written report to external stakeholders that includes only 
descriptive information about the internal audit function.  
 An overall annual written report to external stakeholders that provides only 
positive assurance on the effectiveness of internal control in areas that have 
historically deemed to be material and of higher risk.  
 An overall annual written report to external stakeholders that includes both 
descriptive information about the internal audit function and provides positive 
assurance on the effectiveness of internal control in areas that have 
historically deemed to be material and of higher risk.  
 
The response choices for both questions were randomized for each participant. 
Out of the total of 152 completed experiments, nine failed the reporting relationship 
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manipulation check (5.9%) and 35 failed the report type manipulation check (23%). This 
rate of failure is consistent with some accounting studies targeting high-level participants 
(e.g., DeZoort et al. 2003a, 2003b, 2008). An investigation of the 35 report type failures 
revealed that five (represents 3.3% of the total completed experiments) of them were 
related to the participant selecting the report type 1 (no IAR report) condition when they 
were presented one of the IAR report conditions (type 2, 3, and 4) or vice versa. The 30 
remaining errors (19.7% of the total completed experiments) related to participants who 
were presented one of the IAR report conditions and incorrectly selected a different IAR 
report condition. This suggests that the failure rate may be attributable to the fact that 
IARs to external stakeholders are not used in practice, and the participants were very 
likely to be unfamiliar with externally-issued IARs before reading the case materials. 
Thus, one could expect some degree of difficulty in understanding the report types. After 
eliminating both the reporting relationships and the report type manipulation checks 
failures, 108 participants were left for analysis.
5
  
Table 4 shown below summarizes the number of participants who completed the 
instrument and passed all manipulation checks. The number of responses for each cell is 
consistent with some previous studies in accounting (e.g., DeZoort et al. 2003a, 2003b), 
but see below for additional discussion of power and effect size. 
  
                                                 
5
 If I run the MANCOVA on the full sample (n = 151 due to one incomplete response), the results are 
consistent with those presented in Table 8 below, except that REPORT TYPE (p = 0.3517) and 
REALISTIC (p = 0.1994) are no longer significant. The insignificance of REPORT TYPE appears 
reasonable given that 35 participants failed the report type manipulation check question. 
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TABLE 4 
Fully Completed and Passed All Manipulation Checks 
 Report Type 1 
No IAR 
(represents the 
current 
practice) 
Report Type 2 
Internal auditors 
issue a descriptive 
activities-based 
internal audit 
report to external 
stakeholders 
Report Type 3 
Internal auditors 
issue an 
assurance-based 
internal audit 
report to external 
stakeholders 
Report Type 4 
Internal auditors 
issue a 
descriptive 
activities-based 
and assurance-
based internal 
audit report to 
external 
stakeholders 
Relationship Type 1 
Head of IAF 
effectively reports to 
senior management 
(CFO) 
15 participants 
 
13 participants 12 participants 17 participants 
Relationship Type 2 
Head of IAF 
effectively reports to 
the AC chair 
12 participants 14 participants 13 participants 12 participants 
 
 In summary, approximately 1,200 individuals were invited to participate in the 
experiment; 286 elected to participate and were presented the reporting relationship 
manipulation (142 were presented the CFO version and 144 the ACC version). After 
completing that manipulation, 281 continued taking the experiment and were presented 
the report manipulation (68 were presented the no IAR version, 77 the descriptive IAR, 
72 the assurance IAR, and 64 the descriptive and assurance IAR). The participants 
continued with the experiment, with 152 fully completing the instrument and 108 fully 
completing the instrument and passing both manipulation checks. The results and 
analyses that follow are based on the sample of 108 participants that passed the 
manipulation checks. 
Participants’ Perceptions of the Case 
 Two questions were used to assess the participants’ perceptions of case realism 
and understandability. Based on a sliding scale from 0-100 (0 represents very unrealistic, 
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50 represents moderately realistic, and 100 represents very realistic), the participants 
found the case to be realistic (mean of REALISTIC = 76.77, SD of 18.54; only one 
participant scored lower than 25 and five scored lower than 50). Based on a sliding scale 
from 0-100 (0 represents very difficult to understand, 50 represents moderately 
understandable, and 100 represents very understandable), participants found the case to 
be understandable (mean of UNDERSTANDABLE = 85.91, SD of 14.05; no participants 
scored lower than 50). Both the means are significantly higher than the scale midpoint of 
50 (p < 0.001). In addition, one-way ANOVAs indicate no significant differences in 
REALISTIC (p = 0.5475) or UNDERSTANDABLE (p = 0.5015) across the eight case 
versions. 
Demographics 
 Demographic information for the 108 participants is shown in Table 5 below. The 
participants were almost equally split between male (49.1 percent) and female (50.1 
percent) and were very experienced (83.3 percent had over 10 years of professional 
experience, and 58.3 percent had over 10 years of internal audit experience). The 
participants typically held high level titles (67.6 percent held titles of Manager or higher 
in the IAF) and represented organizations of varying size and business segments (with the 
majority working for companies with more than $1 billion in revenues). The participants 
held numerous professional certifications (82.4 percent held at least one certification), 
with the CIA (58.3 percent) and CPA (57.4 percent) designations being the most 
predominant. The participants were well educated (many held some form of an advanced 
degree).  
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TABLE 5 
Demographic Information 
 
Gender Male 52 49.1% 
  Female 54 50.9% 
Total Years of  < 5 6 5.6% 
Professional Experience  5 – 10 12 11.1% 
   11 – 15 18 16.7% 
   16 – 20 20 18.5% 
   21 – 25  16 14.8% 
  > 25 36 33.3% 
Years of Professional  < 5 14
6
 13.0% 
Experience in Internal Audit   5 – 10 31 28.7% 
   11 – 15 23 21.3% 
   16 – 20 16 14.8% 
   21 – 25  9 8.3% 
  > 25 15 13.9% 
Current Title Chief Audit Executive 21 19.4% 
  Director of Internal Audit  32 29.7% 
  Manager of Internal Audit  20 18.5% 
  Accounting/Consulting Firm Partner  5 4.6% 
  
Accounting/Consulting Firm Senior 
Manager  1 0.9% 
  Accounting/Consulting Firm Manager  1 0.9% 
  Senior Internal Auditor 16 14.8% 
  Information Technology Auditor 2 1.9% 
  Senior Business Analyst 2 1.9% 
  Other  8 7.4% 
Business Segment Consulting 7 6.5% 
  Government 14 13.0% 
  Public Accounting  1 0.9% 
  Public Company 49 45.4% 
  Private For-Profit Company  24 22.2% 
  Not-For-Profit  6 5.6% 
  Other 14 13.0% 
  
                                                 
6
 If these 14 participants are deleted, the results of the MANCOVA in Table 8 are unaffected, except that 
PUBLIC COMPANY has p = 0.234. 
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Annual Revenue Less than $10 million  4 3.8% 
  $10 million to $50 million  5 4.7% 
  $51 million to $100 million  4 3.8% 
  $101 million to $200 million  7 6.6% 
  $201 million to $300 million  3 2.8% 
  $301 million to $400 million  3 2.8% 
  $401 million to $500 million  9 8.5% 
  $501 million to $1 billion  15 14.2% 
  Over $1 billion  56 52.8% 
Professional Certifications  CIA 63 58.3% 
  CFA  3 2.8% 
  CFE  15 13.9% 
  CMA  3 2.8% 
  CPA 62 57.4% 
  None 19 17.6% 
Educational Status  Undergraduate Degree in Accounting  64 59.3% 
  Other Undergraduate Degree  26 24.1% 
  MBA 35 32.4% 
  Masters in Accountancy 18 16.7% 
  Masters in Taxation 1 0.9% 
  Other Masters Degree 8 7.4% 
  Doctoral Degree in Accounting 2 1.9% 
  Other Doctoral Degree 0 0.0% 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Descriptive statistics for the primary dependent variables (fraud risk assessment 
and control risk assessment) are shown in Table 6. Using one-way ANOVAs (as shown 
in Table 7), the differences between the means are analyzed and discussed below. 
Fraud Risk Assessment 
Using a one-way ANOVA, the fraud risk assessment means for the report type 
condition (no IAR type 1 mean of 64.70, descriptive IAR type 2 mean of 70.78, 
assurance IAR type 3 mean of 78.72, and descriptive and assurance type 4 mean of 
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74.93) were different with marginal significance (F = 2.14, p = 0.0995), justifying further 
investigation using t-tests.  
Using two sample t-tests (not tabulated), there were significant differences 
between report type 1 and report type 3 (p = 0.0092), and report type 1 and report type 4 
(p = 0.0277). A marginally significant difference between report type 2 and report type 3 
(p = 0.0948) was also found. No significant differences were found between report type 1 
and report type 2 (p = 0.1997), report type 2 and report type 4 (p = 0.2193), and report 
type 3 and report type 4 (p = 0.7922). Overall, these univariate results are partially 
consistent with Hypotheses 1A – 1C; however, multivariate testing has not yet been 
performed. 
The fraud risk assessment means for the relationship type conditions (CFO – type 
1 mean of 68.65 and ACC type 2 mean of 76.73) were significantly different (F = 4.58, p 
= 0.0346), which is consistent with Hypothesis 2. 
Control Risk Assessment 
The control risk assessment means for the report type conditions (no IAR type 1 
mean of 83.11, descriptive IAR type 2 mean of 87.93, assurance IAR type 3 mean of 
87.08, and descriptive and assurance type 4 mean of 82.90) were not significantly 
different (F = 1.20, p = 0.3135), inconsistent with H1A – H1C. The control risk 
assessment means for the relationship type condition (CFO type 1 mean of 81.51 and 
ACC type 2 mean of 89.27) were significantly different (F = 11.37, p = .0010), which is 
consistent with Hypothesis 2. 
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TABLE 6 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
  
Fraud Control 
    Risk Risk 
Report Type 1 n 27 27 
No External Mean 64.70 83.11 
Report S.D. 19.82 13.38 
Report Type 2 n 27 27 
Descriptive Mean 70.78 87.93 
Report S.D. 23.88 8.74 
Report Type 3 n 25 25 
Assurance  Mean 78.72 87.08 
Report S.D. 19.62 13.32 
Report Type 4 n 29 29 
Descriptive and Mean 74.93 82.90 
Assurance Report S.D. 15.30 13.75 
Relationship Type 1 n 57 57 
Chief Financial Mean 68.65 81.51 
Officer S.D. 18.72 13.04 
Relationship Type 2 n 51 51 
Audit Committee Mean 76.73 89.27 
Chair S.D. 20.50 10.59 
 
TABLE 7 
One-way ANOVAs 
 
  
Fraud Risk Control Risk 
  
Assessment Assessment 
Report  F-statistic 2.14 1.2 
Type p-value 0.0995 0.3135 
Relationship F-statistic 4.58 11.37 
Type p-value 0.0346 0.001 
 
MANCOVA Results 
 The model used in the study included multiple dependent variables (FRAUD 
RISK, CONTROL RISK) that are correlated (r = 0.4683, p < 0.001), as well as 
independent variables that include both continuous and nominal variables. As a result, I 
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used MANCOVA to assess the overall relationships. Prior research does not provide 
clear insights as to what variables should be included as control variables; therefore, I 
performed exploratory analyses using the two primary dependent variables (fraud risk 
assessment and control risk assessment) and report type and relationship type as 
independent variables. I then added each potential control variable as an additional 
independent variable one at a time to identify any variables with significant effects. I did 
this for all of the potential control variables.  
The two control variables that were significantly related to the dependent 
variables were public company (fixed effect; = 1 for public company respondents, else 0) 
and realistic (covariate; participants’ assessments of the realism of the internal control 
issue presented in the case using a scale from 0 to 100). The degree of oversight and 
requirements for public companies are significantly different from those of private 
companies. Using the public company variable as a control variable is consistent with 
that difference in practice, and the hypothetical case uses a public company setting. In 
addition, since the case is an experiment whereby the participants are asked to evaluate a 
specific internal control challenge, their perception of case realism is also an important 
control variable, as it may reflect their prior experiences with such issues and expertise in 
evaluating such issues.  
The final MANCOVA model used in the study includes the two primary 
dependent variables of fraud risk assessment and control risk assessment, report type, 
reporting relationship type, the interaction of the IAR report type and relationship type, 
and the two control variables of public company and realistic:  
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(FRAUD RISK, CONTROL RISK) = f (REPORT TYPE
1
, REPORTING 
RELATIONSHIP TYPE
2
, REPORT TYPE X RELATIONSHIP TYPE, 
PUBLIC COMPANY, REALISTIC) 
1 
NO REPORT, DESCRIPTIVE REPORT, ASSURANCE REPORT, 
DESCRIPTIVE AND ASSURANCE REPORT 
2
ACCOUNTABLE CFO, ACCOUNTABLE AUDIT COMMITTEE CHAIR  
The results of the MANCOVA are shown in Table 8 below. The results of the 
model are significant, with F = 3.12, p < .00001. Four of the five variables are 
individually significant, with report type (F = 2.25, p = 0.0399) and relationship type (F = 
5.16, p = 0.0074) affecting the participants’ fraud and control risk assessments. The 
interaction between report type and relationship type is also significant (F = 2.49, p = 
0.0240); see the ANCOVA analyses below for further discussion of the interaction. The 
covariate REALISTIC is significant (F = 4.96, p = 0.0089), with the participants making 
more conservative risk assessments as their perceptions of case realism increased. Public 
company has F = 2.32 and p = 0.1034.
7
 Observed power is 0.78 for REPORT TYPE, 0.82 
for RELATIONSHIP TYPE, and 0.82 for REPORT TYPE X RELATIONSHIP TYPE, 
all consistent with the typical benchmark of 0.80 (e.g., UCLA 2012c). 
  
                                                 
7
 When I add other potential control variables to this model one at a time (e.g., gender, professional 
experience, internal audit experience, title, industry (beyond public company), company revenues, 
professional certification, education, case understandability, perceptions of IARs, and actual IAF oversight 
in the participant’s organization), each is insignificant (p > 0.05). Masters in accounting, masters in tax, and 
CPA were marginally significant (p < 0.10), but did not affect the other results. 
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TABLE 8 
Overall MANCOVA Results 
DVs = Fraud Risk and Control Risk 
N = 108 
 
 
F-statistic p-value 
MODEL 3.12 <.00001 
REPORT TYPE 2.25 0.0399 
RELATIONSHIP TYPE 5.16 0.0074 
REPORT TYPE X 
RELATIONSHIP TYPE 2.49 0.0240 
PUBLIC COMPANY 2.32 0.1034 
REALISTIC 4.96 0.0089 
 
ANCOVAs and Planned Contrast Testing  
 In order to test the hypotheses, I use individual ANCOVAs for fraud risk 
assessment and control risk assessment, using the controls and interaction term from the 
MANCOVA model. In addition, I use planned contrast testing to test the individual 
report type levels (levels 1, 2, 3, and 4). For example, when comparing level 1 to level 2 
the contrasts were coded 1, -1, 0, 0 (UCLA 2012a). Hypotheses H1A – H1C predict an 
ordering in that fraud risk and control risk assessments are expected to be in the 
following order by report type: no report < activities-based report < assurance-based 
report < activities-based and assurance-based report. The ANCOVA results are shown in 
Table 9, and the planned contrast testing results are shown in Table 10 below. The 
adjusted R-squares are 14.43% and 19.89% for the fraud risk and control risk 
ANCOVAs, respectively. 
Overall, the ANCOVA results for REPORT TYPE are significant for fraud risk 
assessment (F = 3.23, p = 0.0259) and are not significant for control risk assessment (F = 
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1.70, p = 0.1727).
8
 Thus, H1A – H1C are not supported for control risk, and planned 
contrasts are needed to identify the specific significant differences for fraud risk. As 
shown in Table 10, the planned contrasts reveal significant differences (p < 0.05) across 
the levels of report type, except for no report versus activities-based report (p = 0.3679) 
and assurance-based report versus activities-based and assurance-based report (p = 
0.6608). Thus, there is considerable support for H1. Specifically, internal auditors’ fraud 
risk assessments are higher (more conservative) when the IAR is assurance-based or both 
activities and assurance-based than when the report is only activities-based or there is no 
external report. 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that internal auditors primarily reporting to the audit 
committee chair will make more conservative judgments than internal auditors primarily 
reporting to management. This hypothesis is strongly supported for control risk 
assessment (F = 10.11, p = 0.002) and is marginally supported for fraud risk assessment 
(F = 3.53, p = 0.0633). Thus, the results indicate that when the Chief Audit Executive 
reports primarily to the Audit Committee Chair (as opposed to management), internal 
auditors’ control risk assessments are higher (more conservative). This relation is 
marginally significant for fraud risk assessments.
9
  
Overall, there is evidence that internal audit report type and reporting relationship 
each affect certain internal auditor judgments, increasing the conservatism of certain risk 
assessments when accountability to stakeholders or the audit committee increases. 
                                                 
8
 For REPORT TYPE, the observed power is 0.73, and Cohen’s f = 0.31, indicating an effect size between 
medium (0.25) and large (0.40) (UCLA 2012b). For RELATIONSHIP TYPE, observed power is 0.46, and 
Cohen’s f = 0.19, indicating an effect size between small (0.10) and medium (0.25). Thus, the observed 
power for RELATIONSHIP TYPE is low, biasing against finding a significant effect. 
9
 For RELATIONSHIP TYPE, the observed power is 0.88, and Cohen’s f = 0.32, indicating an effect size 
between medium (0.25) and large (0.40) (UCLA 2012b).  
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As shown in Table 9 below, PUBLIC COMPANY is significant in the control risk 
ANCOVA (F = 4.18, p = 0.0436) and not significant in the fraud risk ANCOVA (F = 
0.05, p = 0.820). This result may be due to the extreme focus on internal controls for 
public companies in the wake of Sarbanes-Oxley and Section 404. In addition, 
Hermanson et al. (2012) find evidence of stronger internal controls in public companies 
than in other organizations. Therefore, the control weaknesses presented in the case might 
appear to be more sensitive (negative) to participants working in public companies.  
The covariate REALISTIC is significant in the fraud risk ANCOVA (F = 10.02, p 
= 0.002) and not significant in the control risk ANCOVA (F = 1.80, p = 0.1834). It is 
possible that greater case realism is associated with greater appreciation of the potential 
for fraud in the revenue scenario. 
Finally, there is a significant (p = 0.0046) interaction in the control risk 
ANCOVA, REPORT TYPE X RELATIONSHIP TYPE.
10
 Table 11 presents the means 
and standard deviations of CONTROL RISK for each of the eight cells. As the table 
illustrates, for the CFO relationship type, the mean value of the control risk assessment 
for the no report type is 84.07. This value is statistically the same at 87.62 for Report 
Type 2 and then statistically decreases (p = 0.0553 two-tailed) to 78.17 for Report Type 3 
and 76.94 for Report Type 4. Thus, the control risk assessment declines once the IAR 
includes assurance, which is inconsistent with the expected pattern. In this condition, the 
IAF reports primarily to the CFO, and the CFO is the leader of the project that is the 
subject of the internal control testing.  
Conversely, under the ACC relationship type, the control risk mean marginally 
increases from Report Type 1 of 81.92 to Report Type 2 of 88.12 (p = 0.0941). The mean 
                                                 
10
 For REPORT TYPE X RELATIONSHIP TYPE, observed power is 0.88. 
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significantly increases from Report Type 2 to Report Type 3 at 95.31 (p = 0.0079) and 
holds at 91.33 for Report Type 4. Thus, in the audit committee chair condition, the 
control risk assessment increases once the IAR includes assurance, consistent with the 
expected pattern.
11,
 
12
 
 TABLE 9  
ANCOVA Results 
Fraud Risk and Control Risk 
N = 108 
 
 
DV = Fraud Risk DV = Control Risk 
 
F-statistic p-value F-statistic p-value 
MODEL 3.00 0.0033 3.95 0.0003 
REPORT TYPE 3.23 0.0259 1.70 0.1727 
RELATIONSHIP 
TYPE 3.53 0.0633 10.11 0.002 
REPORT TYPE X 
RELATIONSHIP 
TYPE 1.55 0.2069 4.61 0.0046 
PUBLIC COMPANY 0.05 0.8202 4.18 0.0436 
REALISTIC 10.02 0.0021 1.80 0.1834 
 
                                                 
11
 The Breusch-Pagan test indicates the presence of heteroskedasticity in both ANCOVA models, while the 
Levene test indicates heteroskedasticity only in the Control Risk model. Accordingly, I conducted two 
sensitivity tests. First, I converted the Fraud Risk and Control Risk variables to ranks and reran the 
MANCOVA and ANCOVA models using the ranks as the dependent variables (see Conover 1980; 
DeZoort et al. 2003a, 2003b). The results are consistent with those reported in Tables 8 and 9 (Public 
Company is not significant in the MANCOVA). Second, I ran regression models using robust standard 
errors (e.g., see DeZoort et al. 2003b). The models I ran were: Fraud Risk [or Control risk] = f (Report 
Type [two dummy variables, Activities and Assurance], Relationship Type, Realistic, and Public 
Company). In the fraud risk model, Assurance, Relationship Type, and Realistic are related to Fraud Risk 
(p < 0.05). In addition, the coefficient on Assurance is greater than the coefficient on Activities (p = 0.085). 
These results are similar to those in Table 9. In the Control Risk model, Relationship Type (p < 0.001) and 
Public Company (p = 0.063 two-tailed) are related to Control risk. These results also are similar to those 
presented in Table 9. 
12
 If the interaction terms in Table 9 are deleted, the Table 9 results for the other variables are similar, as are 
the contrast testing results in Table 10. Also, if I run very simple ANOVAs (i.e., Fraud Risk [Control risk] 
= f (Report Type, Relationship Type)), the results are as follows. In the Fraud Risk model, Report Type has 
p = 0.1001 and Relationship Type has p = 0.0363. The contrast tests for Report Type reveal differences 
between Type 1 and Type 3 (p = 0.0215) and between Type 1 and Type 4 (p = 0.0621). In the Control Risk 
model, Relationship Type has p = 0.0018). Thus, the pattern of results is consistent with that reported in 
Tables 9 and 10, although somewhat weaker for Report Type. The MANOVA results for a simple model 
(Fraud Risk, Control Risk = f (Report Type, Relationship Type)) are similar to the simple model ANOVAs 
– Report Type has p = 0.1267 (except p = 0.0660 using Roy’s largest root), and Relationship Type has p = 
0.0060. Thus, the inclusion of the covariates produces stronger results for Report Type and Relationship 
Type. 
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TABLE 10 
Planned Contrast Testing to Isolate Effect of Report Type on Fraud Risk 
 
 
DV = Fraud Risk 
 
F-statistic p-value 
Report 1 vs. Report 2 – No report vs. 
activities-based 0.90 0.3679 
Report 1 vs. Report 3 – No report vs. 
assurance-based 4.38 <.00001 
Report 1 vs. Report 4 – No report vs. 
activities-based and assurance-based 4.77 <.00001 
Report 2 vs. Report 3 – Activities-
based vs. assurance-based 12.3 0.0007 
Report 2 vs. Report 4 - Activities-
based vs. activities-based and 
assurance-based 3.92 0.0002 
Report 3 vs. Report 4 – Assurance-
based vs. activities-based and 
assurance-based 0.44 0.6608 
 
TABLE 11 
REPORT TYPE X RELATIONSHIP TYPE in Control Risk ANCOVA (p = 0.0046) 
Control Risk Means by Cell 
 
  
Report 
  
Types 
  
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 
  
No  Descriptive Assurance Descriptive 
  
Report Report Report and Assurance 
  
            Report 
  
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Relationship 
Type 1 - 
CFO 84.07 12.35 87.61 9.65 78.17 13.588 76.94 14.06 
Types 
Type 2 - 
ACC 81.92 15.03 88.21 8.16 95.31 5.76 91.33 7.81 
 
 
Additional Testing of Report Type 
 
 In addition to testing the defined hypotheses, I performed additional testing of the 
effect of having only two report types (REPORT TYPE01; 0 = no report, 1 = any type of 
external IAR). This test may be useful to practice to determine whether the mere presence 
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of any external report to external stakeholders has an effect fraud risk or control risk 
assessments. I run separate ANCOVAs for fraud risk and control risk, similar to the ones 
above, but replacing REPORT TYPE with REPORT TYPE01. 
The results (not tabulated) indicate that the presence of any type of external 
internal audit report to external stakeholders has a significant effect on the judgments 
made by internal auditors when performing fraud risk assessments (p = 0.0067), but not 
when performing control risk assessments (p = 0.1219). 
ANCOVA Results with Four Secondary Dependent Variables 
 In order to provide additional insight into the effects of report type and 
relationship type, I use individual ANCOVAs for the four secondary dependent variables, 
using the controls and interaction term from the MANCOVA model. The ANCOVA 
results for control testing hours and justification to the CFO are shown in Table 12, and 
the planned contrast testing results (when report type is at least marginally significant) 
are shown in Table 13 below.
13
 The ANCOVA models for control testing experience 
level and comfort level with CFO are not significant (model p-values = 0.5008 and 
0.0984, respectively) and are not tabulated. 
The ANCOVA results for REPORT TYPE are marginally significant for control 
testing hours (F = 2.67, p = 0.0519) and justification to the CFO (F = 2.43, p = 0.0699). 
As shown in Table 13, the planned contrasts for control testing hours reveal significant 
                                                 
13
 The Breusch-Pagan and Levene tests indicate the presence of heteroskedasticity in the Control Testing 
Hours ANCOVA in Table 12. Accordingly, I conducted two sensitivity tests. First, I converted the Control 
Testing Hours variable to ranks and reran the ANCOVA model using the ranks as the dependent variable 
(see Conover 1980; DeZoort et al. 2003a, 2003b). The results for Report Type are no longer significant. 
Second, I ran a regression model using robust standard errors (e.g., see DeZoort et al. 2003b). The model I 
ran was: Control Testing Hours = f (Report Type [two dummy variables, Activities and Assurance], 
Relationship Type, Realistic, and Public company). The overall model was not significant (p = 0.1314). 
Based on these results, the Control Testing Hours ANCOVA results in Table 12 and the related planned 
contrasts in Table 13 should be interpreted with caution. 
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differences (p < 0.05) across report type one and report type two, report type one and 
report type three, report type one and report type four. The planned contrasts reveal no 
significant differences (p > 0.05 in all cases) across the levels of report type for 
justification to CFO (report type three and four are marginally different, p = 0.0766). The 
ANCOVA results for RELATIONSHIP TYPE are not significant for control testing 
hours (F = 0.16, p = 0.6914) and justification to CFO (F = 0.50, p = 0.4792). Overall, the 
results in Tables 12 and 13, along with those in footnote 6, provide very little evidence of 
any meaningful effects of report type on these secondary dependent variables. 
TABLE 12 
ANCOVA – Control Testing Hours and Justification to CFO 
 
Control Testing Justification 
 
Hours to CFO 
 
F-statistic p-value F-statistic p-value 
MODEL 2.04 0.0427 2.45 0.0145 
REPORT TYPE 2.67 0.0519 2.43 0.0699 
RELATIONSHIP TYPE 0.16 0.6914 0.50 0.4792 
REPORT TYPE X RELATIONSHIP TYPE 1.93 0.1297 2.03 0.1152 
PUBLIC COMPANY 4.8 0.0309 3.32 0.0716 
REALISTIC 0.08 0.7742 1.36 0.2457 
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TABLE 13 
Planned Contrast Testing – Control Test Hours and Justification to CFO 
 
 
Control Testing Justification to 
 
Hours CFO 
 
F-statistic p-value F-statistic p-value 
Report 1 vs. Report 2 – No report vs.  
activities-based 3.99 0.0484 0.00 0.997 
Report 1 vs. Report 3 – No report vs.  
assurance-based 7.77 0.0064 2.25 0.1368 
Report 1 vs. Report 4 – No report vs.  
activities-based and assurance-based 9.64 0.0025 0.17 0.6777 
Report 2 vs. Report 3 – Activities-based  
vs. assurance-based 0.81 0.3698 2.22 0.1397 
Report 2 vs. Report 4 – Activities-based  
vs. activities-based and assurance-based 1.56 0.2153 0.17 0.6767 
Report 3 vs. Report 4 – Assurance-based  
vs. activities-based and assurance-based 0.12 0.34 3.2 0.0766 
 
Survey Results 
 In addition to the experiment materials, the instrument included eight survey 
questions to assess the participants’ support level for the issuance of various IARs, to 
understand the perceived costs associated with issuing various IARs, and to gain insight 
as to where the internal audit function currently reports in practice.  
Since public companies are subject to a higher degree of oversight (e.g., 
Securities and Exchange Commission and Public Company Accounting Oversight Board) 
and typically have more resources and stronger controls than do non-public companies 
(e.g., Hermanson et al. 2012), responses to these survey questions may vary depending on 
whether the respondent works for a public or non-public company. I present the 
descriptive statistics segmented by these two groups (public and other) in Table 14 and 
perform one-way ANOVAs to identify significant differences between groups.  
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Descriptive IAR 
 As shown in Table 14, participants working for public companies show a 
moderate level of support for the issuance of a descriptive IAR (mean = 46.35, S.D. = 
29.41), and non-public participants show a higher than moderate level of support (mean = 
56.85, S.D. = 30.41). Both groups have high standard deviations, indicating that support 
for a descriptive IAR widely varies among the participants. The one-way ANOVA 
indicates that the two means of the groups are marginally different, (F = 3.22, p = 0.076).  
The most frequent reasons stated for support of a descriptive IAR include 
recognition and elevation of the IAF (19 respondents), improved corporate governance 
(15 respondents), and benchmarking opportunities (3 respondents).
14
  
Select participants’ responses to support reasons noted above included: 
IAF Recognition and Elevation 
A report like this to external stakeholders would make the internal audit 
department much more important. This would be a great move. 
 
All stakeholders should have an understanding of the Internal Audit 
function, its role and responsibilities, organizational and reporting 
structure, resource skills and expertise, and the annual efforts completed. 
 
1) Believer in transparency and disclosure. 2) May help in ensuring that 
department is adequately staffed and resourced. 3) Motivating tool to 
move the department forward.  
 
Improved Corporate Governance 
 
Internal Audit reviews controls at a level few other organizations can. IA 
is also the only organization with a holistic perspective of controls. 
External stakeholders should receive a report from IA indicating what was 
reviewed to assure them the company is not in the habit of by-passing key 
controls, especially during a software conversion.  
 
                                                 
14
 Open-ended questions were coded independently by two investigators. These two sets of codes were 
compared and any discrepancies were discussed and resolved. There were very few discrepancies noted. 
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Such information might provide the user with more assurance regarding 
the governance and oversight conditions within a company. However, this 
information may become as biased as the Management Discussion and 
Analysis section of the financial statements as the internal auditors may be 
constrained not to air the full extent of the company’s “dirty laundry”.  
 
1) To promote the independence of internal audit department. 2) 
Preventive mitigation of fraud risk 3) The Internal Audit [function] has 
better experience and insight and understanding of the operations, 
systems, financials and related issues and are in position to provide more 
accurate and reliable report about the organization than any external 
parties.  
 
Benchmarking Opportunities 
 
It will assist stakeholders to better understand the relevance of internal 
audit departments to organizations and provide data for benchmarking. 
 
The most frequent reasons stated for a lack of support for a descriptive IAR 
include limited value (10 respondents), not the role of the IAF (8 respondents), 
cost/time/resources (2 respondents), and lack of organizational support (2 respondents).  
Select participants’ responses to support reasons noted above included: 
Limited Value 
Most external stakeholders do not even review the annual reports. If they 
do, they look for the external auditor opinion. Unless there is some 
regulatory requirement for internal audit to produce such a report, it would 
seem doing so would merely be a “make work” effort. 
 
I’m not sure that this information would be relevant to external 
stakeholders. The information would surely be relevant to the external 
auditors, but stakeholders should be able to rely on the external auditor’s 
opinion. 
 
Based upon the info above, this would appear to be a fairly limited report 
containing only limited insight into the function.  
 
Not the Role of the IAF 
 
I’ve always been of the opinion that Internal Audit serves as the eyes and 
ears of management. To that end, management should not be obliged to 
answer to external stakeholders. 
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External reporting is the role of the external auditors. Internal auditors are 
a management tool for monitoring and assurance. Knowing that reports 
would be seen by external stakeholders which may ultimately be used for 
negative purposes, IA would face resistance in obtaining the necessary 
open communications with their clients. 
 
Internal audit works for the management of the company. Reporting to 
external stakeholders should be done by company management and/or by 
the external auditors. 
 
Cost/Time/Resources 
 
My department has too many requests now and do not need more on our 
plate.  
 
Lack of Organizational Support 
 
Not really sure of how much support I would receive to provide to this 
idea. I wouldn’t want to publish sensitive audit material to external parties 
and the financial guidance already establishes the reports that need to be 
shared with external sources. Without providing detail, how helpful would 
the report be to stakeholders? And I’m worried about the CFO’s influence 
over the content of the report. 
 
 The two groups’ mean estimates of the cost of issuing a descriptive IAR (public 
mean = 17.71, non-public mean = 17.37) are not statistically different (F = 0.004, p = 
0.95). The standard deviations are high (public S.D. = 30.10, non-public S.D. = 24.95), 
indicating variability among the respondents. Overall, the mean estimated cost to issue a 
descriptive IAR is between 17 – 18%, and the median was 10 – 12%, of the current IAF 
budget, which is a significant cost, considering that the report would share only 
information about internal audit’s activities.  
Assurance IAR 
 As shown in Table 14, the level of support for issuing an assurance IAR is less 
than the scale midpoint of 50 for both public (mean = 35.16, S.D. 26.33) and non-public 
(mean = 38.07, S.D. = 30.87) participants. The degree of variability among respondents is 
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also high. The mean support for an assurance IAR is not statistically different between 
the two groups (F = 0.27, p = 0.61). The most frequent reasons stated for support of an 
assurance IAR include improved corporate governance (7 respondents) and recognition 
and elevation of the IAF (3 respondents). The participants’ direct quotations for these 
reasons were similar to those provided for the support of the descriptive report above.  
The most frequent reasons stated for a lack of support for a descriptive IAR 
include increased responsibility and risk (17 respondents), not the role of the IAF (14 
respondents), overlap with what the external auditors provide (11 respondents), 
cost/time/resources (10 respondents), and the magnitude of the change/lack of 
organizational support (5 respondents). Many of the participants’ direct quotations for 
these reasons were similar to those provided for the support of the descriptive report. 
Selected participants’ responses to support the new reasons above, along with some 
additional comments related to cost/time/resources noted above, included: 
Increased Responsibility and Risk 
This is a good idea but I do not know if I would want to have this risk as 
the leader of internal audit. 
 
Positive assurance equates to using IA as a scapegoat when things go 
wrong. There will always be issues that go uncovered, and no matter how 
carefully positive assurance is worded, it can also be used to blame IA for 
not finding more. 
 
A report to external stakeholders would introduce significant risk to the 
internal audit department. Additionally, the wide variance in what is meant 
by effective internal control means that it would be very difficult to 
produce a report that is consistent across the internal audit universe. 
However, an inconsistent report would produce little of value to external 
stakeholders without a consistent and common definition. 
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Magnitude of Change 
 
If internal audit were to start to issue assurance reports to the public it 
would change the game. I am not sure how it would be implemented.  
 
Good concept, however, my management team would not accept this 
unless it was mandated. 
 
Cost/Time/Resources 
 
While an external report of positive assurance could be valuable for 
investors, it would also significantly drive the scope of the annual internal 
audit plan. To state that historically “material and higher risk” areas would 
be evaluated almost implies these areas would need to be audited each and 
every year. In any given year, there may be higher risks that should be 
audited for that particular year, and the CAE should have that discretion 
instead of being forced into more repetitive audits. 
 
I would support this more if I can obtain more resources or get support to 
ensure all work is performed timely and accurately. 
 
 The mean estimated cost for issuing an assurance IAR for public participants 
(mean = 77.80, median = 50, S.D. = 73.69) is much higher than that of non-public 
participants (mean = 43.02, median = 36, S.D. = 40.34). The difference in means is 
statistically different (F = 9.29, p = 0.003). This may be attributed to the formal control 
and review processes typically present in public companies. In both public companies 
and other organizations, it is clear that the respondents believe that internal audit budgets 
would increase substantially if assurance-based IARs were issued. 
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IAF Oversight and Budget Determination 
 The Institute of Internal Auditors calls for the head of the IAF to receive strategic 
direction and reinforcement from the audit committee chair, while also reporting to 
management for assistance in establishing direction and support, and as an administrative 
interface (IIA 2010a). Under this definition, the balance of oversight would seem to 
reside with the audit committee chair, with management operating in more of a support 
and interface role. However, Abbott et al. (2010) found a fairly even balance between the 
audit committee and management in terms of internal audit oversight. 
To provide additional insight into this issue, I asked the respondents about the 
nature of their IAF’s oversight. The results (see Table 14) reveal that the non-public 
participants indicate the oversight of the IAF resides more closely with management than 
with the audit committee chair (mean = 40.97, S.D. = 30.1). This mean is statistically 
different (p = 0.026) from the scale midpoint of 50. In addition, the non-public 
participants indicate that the IAF budget determination resides more with management 
(mean = 26.07, S.D. = 25.42) than with the audit committee chair. This mean is 
statistically different (p = <0.001) from the scale midpoint of 50. These findings indicate 
that the balance of reporting in practice for the non-public participants resides with 
management for both measures of oversight.  
The public participants indicated that the oversight of the IAF resides equally 
between management and the audit committee chair (mean = 51.76, S.D. = 22.72). This 
mean is not statistically different (p = 0.59) from the scale midpoint of 50. In addition, 
the public participants indicated that the budget determination (mean = 39.22, S.D. 27.28) 
resided more with management than the audit committee chair. This mean is statistically 
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different (p = < 0.008) from the scale midpoint of 50. These findings indicate that the 
balance of oversight for public participants resides equally with management and the 
audit committee chair and resides with management for budget determination.  
TABLE 14 
Survey Responses 
Perceptions of IARs and Actual IAF Oversight 
 
  
 
n Mean S.D 
Difference 
p-value 
Descriptive Support Public 48 46.35 29.41 0.0757 
IAR Support Non - Public 59 56.85 30.64   
  Cost Public 49 17.71 30.1 0.9486 
  Cost Non - Public 57 17.37 24.95   
Assurance Support Public 49 35.16 26.33 0.6052 
IAR Support Non - Public 58 38.07 30.87   
  Cost Public 49 77.88 73.69 0.0029 
  Cost Non - Public 56 43.02 40.35   
Oversight Public 49 51.76 22.72 0.0418 
IAF Non - Public 58 40.97 30.1   
Determination Public 49 39.22 27.28 0.012 
IAF Budget Non - Public 56 26.07 25.42   
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
 
This study examined the effects of IAR type at four levels (no report/current state 
of practice, descriptive report of activities, assurance report on the internal controls, and a 
descriptive report of activities and an assurance report on the internal controls) and senior 
level internal audit’s reporting relationship at two levels (primarily to management or 
primarily to the audit committee chair) on internal auditors’ fraud risk and control risk 
assessments.  
I find that the issuance of an internal audit report (IAR) to external stakeholders 
affects internal auditors’ judgments. Specifically, internal auditors’ fraud risk 
assessments are higher (more conservative) when the IAR is assurance-based or both 
activities and assurance-based than when the report is only activities-based or there is no 
external report. Additionally, the results indicate that when the Chief Audit Executive 
reports primarily to the Audit Committee Chair (as opposed to management), internal 
auditors’ control risk assessments are higher (more conservative). This relation is 
marginally significant for fraud risk assessments. Overall, there is evidence that internal 
audit report type and reporting relationship each affect internal auditors’ judgments, 
increasing the conservatism of certain risk assessments when accountability to 
stakeholders or the audit committee increases. 
When asked about their perceptions of IARs, the participants indicated a moderate 
degree of support for the issuance of an activities-based (descriptive) IAR, citing that 
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such a report may provide recognition to the internal audit function (IAF), elevate the 
status of the IAF, improve corporate governance, and enable benchmarking opportunities. 
Participants who did not support the issuance of a descriptive IAR indicated that it may 
provide limited value, may not be consistent with the role of an IAF, may be too 
costly/time consuming, and may lack required organizational support. Overall, the 
participants believe that the issuance of a descriptive IAR would increase the total IAF 
budget by an average of over 17 percent. 
The participants indicated a modest degree of support for the issuance of an 
assurance-based IAR, citing that such a report may increase responsibility and risk to the 
IAF, may not be consistent with the role of the IAF, may overlap with the external 
auditor’s work, may be costly and require significant time/resources, and represents a 
significant change that may not be supported by the organization (also see Archambeault 
et al. 2008). The participants indicated the costs associated with issuing such a report 
would be extremely high, a mean of 78 percent (43 percent) of the current IAF budget for 
public company (non-public company) participants. 
The results also reveal that, in actual practice, the balance of internal audit 
reporting for the non-public participants resides with management, for both oversight and 
budget determination. The balance of oversight for public company participants resides 
equally between management and the audit committee chair (consistent with Abbott et al. 
2010), and resides primarily with management for budget determination. Thus, in actual 
practice, the participants serve in IAFs with significant accountability to management, 
rather than the audit committee. 
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This study used an experimental (and survey) design based on case study material 
and as such will have certain limitations. These include many standard limitations of this 
type of research – external validity, representativeness of the participant group, potential 
for demand effects, and small sample size / limited power in some cases. The case 
involved only a single scenario, and there was no opportunity for group decision-making 
that is found in practice. While this topic has had numerous calls for research, it is a 
relatively new topic. As additional research is performed, a greater understanding will be 
available to design experiments to address such limitations. 
This study has four potential practice implications. First, the results provide 
management and audit committee members with insights into how to design internal 
audit report types and relationship types to promote effective corporate governance. 
These issues are long-standing questions within the practice community, for which 
limited academic research has been performed. Specifically, the findings of the study 
show that report types and reporting relationships affect internal auditors’ risk 
assessments. Report types and reporting relationship types that increase internal audit’s 
accountability to stakeholders and to the audit committee result in more conservative 
judgments. Second, the study highlights the significant potential costs of externally-
issued IARs, which must be weighed against the expected benefits. Third, in their actual 
organizations, participants serve in IAFs with significant accountability to management, 
rather than the audit committee. Such reporting relationships may impede the 
effectiveness of the IAF, as well as the overall effectiveness of corporate governance, 
given that the internal audit function plays such a pivotal role in the governance process 
(Abbott 2010; Cohen et al. 2004; Gramling et al. 2004). In addition, there may be 
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implications for the effectiveness of others within the governance mosaic, such as the 
audit committee and the external auditor who rely on the work of the IAF to fulfill their 
roles. Fourth, the results of this study may be of interest to policy makers, particularly the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, as it governs U.S. public company disclosures. I 
encourage the SEC to carefully consider the costs and benefits of externally-issued IARs, 
especially as this area of research grows.  
Finally, the study has implications for research and theory. The study utilizes 
accountability theory and agency theory to examine a key area of corporate governance. 
In applying these theories in the context of corporate governance, researchers are better 
able to understand how greater accountability of internal auditors may induce greater 
conservatism and monitoring, tenets of agency theory. In addition, the study responds to 
previous calls for academic research and provides a complement to earlier work (Holt 
and DeZoort 2009) that examined the effects of IARs on investors’ judgments.  
Additional research may be pursued that will advance the understanding of the 
potential effects of internal auditor relationship type and report type on other key players 
in the corporate governance mosaic (Cohen et al. 2004), such as the audit committee, 
senior management, and the external auditor. Gaining insight into these critical 
relationships may further advance both practice and theory in the area of corporate 
governance.  
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APPENDIX A - IIA FIRST, SECOND AND THIRD SURVEY REQUESTS  
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From: IIA Chapter President 
 
RE: Important Reminder - Participation in an IIA Award Winning Study  
Dear IIA Atlanta Chapter Members:  
 
I am writing to request your participation in an online study being conducted by Doug 
Boyle, a Doctor of Business Administration (DBA) student at Kennesaw State 
University. This study is part of Doug’s dissertation research focused on improving our 
understanding of internal auditors’ judgments. The study has been reviewed by The IIA 
Research Foundation and awarded its Michael J. Barrett Doctoral Dissertation Grant. 
Your participation is very important to the success of this study. I encourage you to 
click on the link below to complete the study, which should take approximately 20-25 
minutes. 
Everyone who completes the survey by Monday, November 7, 2011 will be eligible to 
enter a drawing to win one (1) of three $100 gift cards.  
 
Your responses will remain strictly confidential and will be analyzed only after being 
combined with the responses of other participants.  
Please click below: 
https://scranton.us2.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_9BmSyXF1xdsV4jy 
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From IIA Chapter President 
 
RE: Important Reminder - Participation in an IIA Award Winning Study  
Dear IIA Atlanta Chapter Members:  
 
I am writing to remind you to please participate in an online study being conducted by 
Doug Boyle, a Doctor of Business Administration (DBA) student at Kennesaw State 
University. This study is part of Doug’s dissertation research focused on improving our 
understanding of internal auditors’ judgments. The study has been reviewed by The IIA 
Research Foundation and awarded its Michael J. Barrett Doctoral Dissertation Grant. 
Your participation is very important to the success of this study. I encourage you to 
click on the link below to complete the study, which should take approximately 20-25 
minutes. 
Everyone who completes the survey by Monday, November 7, 2011 will be eligible to 
enter a drawing to win one (1) of three $100 gift cards.  
 
Your responses will remain strictly confidential and will be analyzed only after being 
combined with the responses of other participants.  
Please click below: 
https://scranton.us2.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_9BmSyXF1xdsV4jy 
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From: IIA Chapter President 
 
RE: Final Reminder - Participation in an IIA Award Winning Study  
Dear IIA Atlanta Chapter Members:  
 
I am writing to thank those of you who participated in the online survey being conducted 
by Doug Boyle, a Doctor of Business Administration (DBA) student at Kennesaw State 
University.  
Doug still needs some additional responses to complete the study so I asking those who 
did not participate to please take the online study.  
This study is part of Doug’s dissertation research focused on improving our 
understanding of internal auditors’ judgments. The study has been reviewed by The IIA 
Research Foundation and awarded its Michael J. Barrett Doctoral Dissertation Grant. 
Your participation is very important to the success of this study. I encourage you to 
click on the link below to complete the study, which should take approximately 25 
minutes. 
Everyone who completes the survey by Monday, November 25, 2011 will be eligible 
to enter a drawing to win one (1) of three $100 gift cards.  
 
Your responses will remain strictly confidential and will be analyzed only after being 
combined with the responses of other participants.  
Please click below: 
https://scranton.us2.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_9BmSyXF1xdsV4jy 
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APPENDIX B – COPY OF CASE INSTRUMENT 
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Q1               
 
 
 
 
 
Consent to Participate in “A Study of Internal Auditors’ Judgments” 
 
We are performing a study to better understand internal auditor judgments. This study has 
been funded by The Institute of Internal Auditors Research Foundation.  Your 
participation is very important to the success of this study. There are no risks from 
completing the survey.      
 
This research examines internal auditor judgments about fraud risk, control risk, 
budgeting, and planning based on a limited set of information. While you will receive no 
direct benefit for participating, you will be providing a very important contribution to 
understanding internal auditor judgments and the audit process. The procedures involve 
you evaluating a hypothetical case and responding to a series of questions.     
 
Your participation in this study is voluntary and you can discontinue participation at any 
time.  
 
You have the right to skip any question that you would prefer not to answer. The 
completion of the survey constitutes informed consent to participate in the study. Your 
responses will remain strictly confidential and will be analyzed only after being 
combined with the responses of other participants.  We will not access or link any 
individual identifying information to your response.          
 
If you have any additional comments or questions about the study, please feel free to 
contact any of the researchers listed below:                   
 
Douglas M. Boyle, CPA, CMA      
Assistant Professor of Accounting      
The University of Scranton      
boyled2@scranton.edu      
570.510.3271          
 
Todd DeZoort, Ph.D., CFE      
Professor of Accounting      
The University of Alabama     
tdezoort@cba.ua.edu      
205.348.6694         
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Dana R. Hermanson, PhD.       
Professor of Accounting       
Kennesaw State University       
dhermans@kennesaw.edu       
770.423.6077             
  
By completing the following screens, you are agreeing to participate in this research 
project.   
 
If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant, you may contact 
Maria Landis, The University of Scranton Research Compliance Coordinator, at (570) 
941-6190 or landism2@scranton.edu or Paula Strange, IRB Administrator, Kennesaw 
State University IRB Administrator, at (678) 797-2268 or pstrange@kennesaw.edu.    
 
We greatly appreciate your help in our efforts to understand internal auditor judgments! 
   
 I have read the consent to participate above and am willing to participate in the study. 
 
Q2           
 
Instructions 
 
1. The pages that follow contain a hypothetical case for your consideration and 
may not follow current standards and/or practices.  
 
2. The case includes summary background information and a number of questions 
for you to answer.  
 
3. Please assume you are working as the Chief Audit Executive for the Company 
when evaluating the case and answering the questions.      
 
4. Please complete the materials in the order presented.      
 
5. There are no right or wrong answers, so please answer the questions in a way that 
reflects your honest opinions and judgments.      
 
6. The case should take between 20 - 25 minutes to complete.          
Thank you for your participation! 
 
90 
 
 
 
Q3  
 
Taft Manufacturing, Incorporated 
                                               
Company and Industry Background 
 
Taft Manufacturing, Inc. (Taft) is a publicly-traded company that manufactures and 
distributes sporting equipment to retailers throughout the United States. Taft operates in a 
competitive market. Competitive factors in the Company’s market include price, quality, 
and customer service. Customer demand has held steady and the industry appears 
relatively robust.  
 
Financial Performance 
 
The Company has experienced growth and margins over the years that are comparable to 
other companies in the industry. The following financial data have been derived from the 
financial statements of the Company. All amounts are in thousands.      
       
  2006 2007 2008 2009  2010  
Net sales  $194,432 $204,875 $208,185 $225,647 $237,264 
Net income (loss) 14,428 15,247 12,632 11,698 13,254 
Total assets 80,841 84,852 86,465 94,741 110,425 
 
Cash flow from operations has remained positive.  
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Management and Compensation 
 
Management has been led for the past 20 years by a respected CEO. The CFO is a CPA 
with public accounting experience from one of the “Big Four” firms and has been with 
the Company for the past 15 years. Management compensation is competitive with the 
industry, and incentive compensation (e.g., bonuses, stock options) is primarily based on 
operating results, financial position, and cash flow. Profitability and trend level 
expectations from analysts, institutional investors, and creditors have been optimistic and 
reasonable.  
 
Audit Committee and Auditor 
 
The audit committee is composed of three independent directors.  The Audit Committee 
Chair (ACC) has been a member of the board for the past 10 years and ACC for the past 
five years. The ACC is a CPA with public accounting experience in one of the “Big 
Four” accounting firms and has experience as a CFO for a public company. The current 
audit firm is one of the “Big Four”.  The firm has audited Taft for the past six years, with 
no significant audit issues noted during this period.  
 
Internal Controls 
 
Taft has historically had effective internal controls with no reportable conditions or 
material weaknesses. The Company is not an accelerated filer and does not have a 404b 
opinion from its auditor. Historically, the Company has had adequate accounting 
information systems and monitoring of controls, including automated controls and 
controls over interim financial reporting (where external reporting is required).    
 
Q4 – Reporting Relationship Manipulation - CFO 
  
Reporting Structure 
 
As head of the Internal Audit Department you have a reporting relationship with the 
Audit Committee Chair (ACC) and the CFO, with the ACC taking a much more active 
oversight role than the CFO.   
 
You discuss topics with the ACC on a frequent basis and receive feedback and direction 
on the scope, timing, and management of the activities of your function. The ACC 
approves the charter, risk assessment, and audit plan for your department. You provide 
direct communication to the ACC on the results of internal audit activities or other 
matters determined to be necessary, including in private meetings. In addition, you meet 
with the ACC in preparation for and during the quarterly audit committee meetings.   
 
The ACC ultimately determines your annual performance rating, compensation 
adjustment, and future career advancement within the organization. The annual budget 
for your department is based on discussions between you and the ACC. The ACC may 
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solicit feedback from the CFO to aid in the assessment of your performance and the 
determination of your budget.  
 
You discuss topics with the CFO on a quarterly basis. During these discussions you 
communicate the direction and support needed from the finance function by your 
department to execute your annual audit plan. In practice, the CFO primarily acts as an 
administrative point person between your department and the finance organization.      
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Q5 - Reporting Relationship Manipulation - ACC 
 
Reporting Structure 
 
As head of the Internal Audit Department you have a reporting relationship with the CFO 
and the Audit Committee Chair (ACC), with the CFO taking a much more active 
oversight role than the ACC.   
 
You discuss topics with the CFO on a frequent basis and receive feedback and direction 
on the scope, timing, and management of the activities of your function. Prior to the 
ACC’s formal approval of the charter, risk assessment, and audit plan for your 
department, the CFO reviews these materials with you and provides feedback and an 
informal approval. You provide direct communication to the CFO on the results of 
internal audit activities or other matters determined to be necessary, including in private 
meetings. In addition, you meet with the CFO in preparation for the quarterly audit 
committee meetings.  
 
The CFO can significantly influence your annual performance rating, compensation 
adjustment, and future career advancement within the organization. The annual budget 
for your department is largely shaped by discussions between you and the CFO. The CFO 
and ACC also discuss your performance and the internal audit budget with each other, 
ultimately leading to formal audit committee approval.  
 
You discuss topics with the ACC on a quarterly basis primarily related to the audit 
committee meeting. In preparation for these meetings, you and the ACC discuss the key 
activities performed by your function since the last meeting and any related findings that 
you deem material.  In practice, the ACC primarily acts a point person between your 
department and the audit committee.    
 
Q6 – Report Type Manipulation – Both External Descriptive and Assurance Report 
 
Internal Audit Reports   
 
As part of your audit process, your department issues a written report after each assigned 
engagement. These engagement-level reports are for internal distribution only. The 
content of the reports varies by assignment but typically includes a summary of findings 
with recommendations to management. The audit committee receives copies of all your 
final reports along with management’s response.   
 
In addition, your department voluntarily issues an overall annual written report to 
external stakeholders. This annual internal audit report is included as an appendix to the 
Company’s proxy statement and is disclosed on the Company’s website at 
www.TaftInc.com.  
 
This report (a) provides descriptive information about your Internal Audit 
Department, including sections on internal audit composition, responsibilities, 
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accountability, activities, and resources and (b) provides positive assurance on the 
effectiveness of internal control in areas that have historically deemed to be material 
and of higher risk. The revenue cycle has been identified as one of these areas. The report 
issued by your department for 2010 is as follows:               
  
Internal Audit Activities Report 
  
Composition 
Taft, Inc. maintains an in-house Internal Audit Department that was established in 1991. 
The department includes a Chief Audit Executive who supervises five other internal 
auditors. The Chief Audit Executive has 10 years of professional experience in internal 
auditing and is a CPA and CIA. 
   
Responsibilities 
The Internal Audit Department acts under a written charter that is updated annually. The 
Internal Audit Department provides assurance and consulting activities designed to add 
value and improve the Company’s operations, and is responsible for evaluating risk 
exposures relating to the Company’s governance, operations, and information systems. 
 
Accountability 
The Internal Audit Charter specifies that the Internal Audit Department’s independence is 
established by the Company’s organizational and reporting structure. The Internal Audit 
Department has a reporting relationship with the Audit Committee Chair and the CFO.  
 
The Internal Audit Department maintains a quality assurance and improvement program 
that covers all aspects of internal audit activity and includes periodic internal 
assessments, external quality assessments at least once every five years, and continuous 
internal monitoring. The results of the most recent external assessment, which was 
conducted by a qualified independent reviewer in 2009, indicate that the Internal Audit 
Department is currently in compliance with all applicable rules of the professional 
guidance offered by The Institute of Internal Auditors’ International Standards for the 
Professional Practice of Internal Auditing. 
 
Activities 
The Internal Audit Department’s activities during 2010 were approximately 60% 
assurance-related and 40% consulting-related. The scope of these activities was 
determined by an evaluation of company risk exposures approved by the audit 
committee. During 2010, the Chief Audit Executive met formally with the audit 
committee and the Company’s independent auditors each quarter to discuss internal audit 
evaluations of the Company’s risk exposures and internal controls. The Chief Audit 
Executive also reviewed and discussed the Company’s audited financial statements and 
management report on internal controls with the audit committee and the independent 
auditor. 
 
Resources 
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For fiscal 2010, the total cost of maintaining the Internal Audit Department was 
$800,000. This amount includes salaries and administrative overhead, and represents 
approximately .5% of the Company’s total operating expenses. 
Internal Audit Assurance Report 
  
We have completed the internal audit plan of internal control over the revenue cycle. The 
objective of this engagement was to determine whether the Company maintained, in all 
material respects, effective internal control over this cycle as of December 31, 2010. 
 
The plan was prepared considering the criteria established in Internal Control – 
Integrated Framework issued by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the 
Treadway Commission COSO).  This Integrated Framework is designed to provide 
reasonable assurance that internal controls are established and effectively operating to 
achieve organizational objectives in the areas of (1) reliability of financial reporting, (2) 
compliance with applicable laws and regulations, and (3) effectiveness and efficiency of 
operations. The internal audit examined the Company’s internal control over this cycle 
based on the results of audit assignments we have completed throughout the year as part 
of our integrated audit plan. These internal audits were conducted in accordance with the 
International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing. Our audit of 
internal control over this cycle included obtaining an understanding of internal control, 
assessing the risk that a material weakness exists, and testing and evaluating the design 
and operating effectiveness of internal control based on the assessed risk. Our audits also 
included performing such other procedures as we considered necessary in the 
circumstances. The criteria were discussed and agreed with management before the 
conduct of detailed audit procedures. 
 
We concluded that the Company maintained, in all material respects, effective internal 
control over this cycle as of December 31, 2010.  Our overall opinion on the internal 
control over the revenue cycle is satisfactory. 
 
In our professional judgment, sufficient and appropriate audit procedures have been 
conducted and evidence gathered to support the accuracy of the conclusions reached and 
contained in this report.  The conclusions were based on a comparison of the situations as 
they existed at the time against the audit criteria.  The conclusions are only applicable for 
the entity examined.  The evidence gathered meets professional audit standards and is 
sufficient to provide senior management with proof of the conclusions derived from the 
internal audit.    
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Q7 - Report Type Manipulation – External Assurance Report [to provide 
participants with 
information about IAF activities] 
 
Internal Audit Department   
    
The Internal Audit Department at Taft was established in 1991 and includes you as the 
Chief Audit Executive and five other internal auditors. You have 10 years of professional 
experience in internal auditing and are a CPA and CIA.     
    
Responsibilities   
 
The Internal Audit Department acts under a written charter that is updated annually. The 
Internal Audit Department provides assurance and consulting activities designed to add 
value and improve the Company’s operations, and is responsible for evaluating risk 
exposures relating to the Company’s governance, operations, and information systems.       
 
Accountability   
 
The Internal Audit Charter specifies that the Internal Audit Department’s independence is 
established by the Company’s organizational and reporting structure. The Internal Audit 
Department has a reporting relationship with the Audit Committee Chair and the CFO.       
 
The Internal Audit Department maintains a quality assurance and improvement program 
that covers all aspects of internal audit activity and includes periodic internal 
assessments, external quality assessments at least once every five years, and continuous 
internal monitoring.  
 
The results of the most recent external assessment, which was conducted by a qualified 
independent reviewer in 2009, indicate that the Internal Audit Department is currently in 
compliance with all applicable rules of the professional guidance offered by The Institute 
of Internal Auditors’ International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal 
Auditing.      
 
Activities   
 
The Internal Audit Department’s activities during 2010 were approximately 60% 
assurance-related and 40% consulting-related. The scope of these activities was 
determined by an evaluation of company risk exposures approved by the audit 
committee.  
 
During 2010, the Chief Audit Executive met formally with the audit committee and the 
Company’s independent auditors each quarter to discuss internal audit evaluations of the 
Company’s risk exposures and internal controls.  
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The Chief Audit Executive also reviewed and discussed the Company’s audited financial 
statements and management report on internal controls with the audit committee and the 
independent auditor.      
 
 
 
Resources   
 
For fiscal 2010, the total cost of maintaining the Internal Audit Department was 
$800,000. This amount includes salaries and administrative overhead, and represents 
approximately .5% of the Company’s total operating expenses.  
 
Q8 - Report Type Manipulation – External Assurance Report 
 
Internal Audit Reports  
  
As part of your audit process, your department issues a written report after each assigned 
engagement. These engagement-level reports are for internal distribution only. The 
content of the reports varies by assignment but typically includes a summary of findings 
with recommendations to management. The audit committee receives copies of all your 
final reports along with management’s response.     
 
In addition, your department voluntarily issues an overall annual written report to 
external stakeholders. This annual internal audit report is included as an appendix to the 
Company’s proxy statement and is disclosed on the Company’s website at 
www.TaftInc.com.  
This report provides positive assurance on the effectiveness of internal control in 
areas that have historically deemed to be material and of higher risk. The revenue cycle 
has been identified as one of these areas. The report issued by your department for 2010 
is as follows:  
Internal Audit Assurance Report  
We have completed the internal audit plan of internal control over the revenue cycle. The 
objective of this engagement was to determine whether the Company maintained, in all 
material respects, effective internal control over this cycle as of December 31, 2010. 
 
The plan was prepared considering the criteria established in Internal Control – 
Integrated Framework issued by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the 
Treadway Commission (COSO).  This Integrated Framework is designed to provide 
reasonable assurance that internal controls are established and effectively operating to 
achieve organizational objectives in the areas of (1) reliability of financial reporting, (2) 
compliance with applicable laws and regulations, and (3) effectiveness and efficiency of 
operations. The internal audit examined the Company’s internal control over this cycle 
based on the results of audit assignments we have completed throughout the year as part 
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of our integrated audit plan. These internal audits were conducted in accordance with the 
International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing. Our audit of 
internal control over this cycle included obtaining an understanding of internal control, 
assessing the risk that a material weakness exists, and testing and evaluating the design 
and operating effectiveness of internal control based on the assessed risk. Our audits also 
included performing such other procedures as we considered necessary in the 
circumstances. The criteria were discussed and agreed with management before the 
conduct of detailed audit procedures. 
 
We concluded that the Company maintained, in all material respects, effective internal 
control over this cycle as of December 31, 2010.  Our overall opinion on the internal 
control over the revenue cycle is satisfactory.  
In our professional judgment, sufficient and appropriate audit procedures have been 
conducted and evidence gathered to support the accuracy of the conclusions reached and 
contained in this report.  The conclusions were based on a comparison of the situations as 
they existed at the time against the audit criteria.  The conclusions are only applicable for 
the entity examined.  The evidence gathered meets professional audit standards and is 
sufficient to provide senior management with proof of the conclusions derived from the 
internal audit.   
 
Q9 - Report Type Manipulation – External Descriptive Report 
 
Internal Audit Reports     
 
As part of your audit process, your department issues a written report after each assigned 
engagement. These engagement-level reports are for internal distribution only. The 
content of the reports varies by assignment but typically includes a summary of findings 
with recommendations to management. The audit committee receives copies of all your 
final reports along with management’s response.     
In addition, your department voluntarily issues an overall annual written report to 
external stakeholders. This annual internal audit report is included as an appendix to the 
Company’s proxy statement and is disclosed on the Company’s website at 
www.TaftInc.com.  
This report provides descriptive information about your Internal Audit Department, 
including sections on internal audit composition, responsibilities, accountability, 
activities, and resources. The report issued by your department for 2010 is as follows:   
                          
 
Internal Audit Activities Report  
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Composition 
Taft, Inc. maintains an in-house Internal Audit Department that was established in 1991. 
The department includes a Chief Audit Executive who supervises five other internal 
auditors. The Chief Audit Executive has 10 years of professional experience in internal 
auditing and is a CPA and CIA.   
 
Responsibilities 
The Internal Audit Department acts under a written charter that is updated annually. The 
Internal Audit Department provides assurance and consulting activities designed to add 
value and improve the Company’s operations, and is responsible for evaluating risk 
exposures relating to the Company’s governance, operations, and information systems. 
 
Accountability 
The Internal Audit Charter specifies that the Internal Audit Department’s independence is 
established by the Company’s organizational and reporting structure. The Internal Audit 
Department has a reporting relationship with the Audit Committee Chair and the CFO.  
 
The Internal Audit Department maintains a quality assurance and improvement program 
that covers all aspects of internal audit activity and includes periodic internal 
assessments, external quality assessments at least once every five years, and continuous 
internal monitoring. The results of the most recent external assessment, which was 
conducted by a qualified independent reviewer in 2009, indicate that the Internal Audit 
Department is currently in compliance with all applicable rules of the professional 
guidance offered by The Institute of Internal Auditors’ International Standards for the 
Professional Practice of Internal Auditing. 
 
Activities 
The Internal Audit Department’s activities during 2010 were approximately 60% 
assurance-related and 40% consulting-related. The scope of these activities was 
determined by an evaluation of company risk exposures approved by the audit 
committee. During 2010, the Chief Audit Executive met formally with the audit 
committee and the Company’s independent auditors each quarter to discuss internal audit 
evaluations of the Company’s risk exposures and internal controls. The Chief Audit 
Executive also reviewed and discussed the Company’s audited financial statements and 
management report on internal controls with the audit committee and the independent 
auditor. 
 
Resources 
For fiscal 2010, the total cost of maintaining the Internal Audit Department was 
$800,000. This amount includes salaries and administrative overhead, and represents 
approximately .5% of the Company’s total operating expenses.   
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Q10 - Report Type Manipulation – No External Report [to provide participants 
with 
information about IAF activities] 
 
Internal Audit Department      
 
The Internal Audit Department at Taft was established in 1991 and includes you as the 
Chief Audit Executive and five other internal auditors. You have 10 years of professional 
experience in internal auditing and are a CPA and CIA.      
  
Responsibilities   
 
The Internal Audit Department acts under a written charter that is updated annually. The 
Internal Audit Department provides assurance and consulting activities designed to add 
value and improve the Company’s operations, and is responsible for evaluating risk 
exposures relating to the Company’s governance, operations, and information systems.      
 
Accountability   
 
The Internal Audit Charter specifies that the Internal Audit Department’s independence is 
established by the Company’s organizational and reporting structure. The Internal Audit 
Department has a reporting relationship with the Audit Committee Chair and the CFO.       
 
The Internal Audit Department maintains a quality assurance and improvement program 
that covers all aspects of internal audit activity and includes periodic internal 
assessments, external quality assessments at least once every five years, and continuous 
internal monitoring. The results of the most recent external assessment, which was 
conducted by a qualified independent reviewer in 2009, indicate that the Internal Audit 
Department is currently in compliance with all applicable rules of the professional 
guidance offered by The Institute of Internal Auditors’ International Standards for the 
Professional Practice of Internal Auditing.     
  
Activities   
 
The Internal Audit Department’s activities during 2010 were approximately 60% 
assurance-related and 40% consulting-related. The scope of these activities was 
determined by an evaluation of company risk exposures approved by the audit 
committee.  
 
During 2010, the Chief Audit Executive met formally with the audit committee and the 
Company’s independent auditors each quarter to discuss internal audit evaluations of the 
Company’s risk exposures and internal controls.  
 
The Chief Audit Executive also reviewed and discussed the Company’s audited financial 
statements and management report on internal controls with the audit committee and the 
independent auditor.      
101 
 
 
 
Resources   
 
For fiscal 2010, the total cost of maintaining the Internal Audit Department was 
$800,000. This amount includes salaries and administrative overhead, and represents 
approximately .5% of the Company’s total operating expenses.  
 
Q11 - Report Type Manipulation – No External Report 
 
Internal Audit Reports   
 
As part of your audit process, your department issues a written report after each assigned 
engagement. All of your reports are for internal distribution only. The content of the 
reports varies by assignment but typically includes a summary of findings with 
recommendations to management. The audit committee receives copies of all your final 
reports along with management’s response.    
 
Q12    
System Conversion and Related Internal Control Issues 
     
Taft has recently gone through an operational and financial system conversion. The 
conversion involved the replacement of all key systems. The conversion was 
implemented by an in-house team reporting to the CFO. The CFO strongly lobbied 
for this initiative and recommended that the system be implemented by an in-house team. 
The Internal Audit Department did not play any significant role in the conversion 
decision or implementation process.      
 
The conversion was completed in the second quarter of the current fiscal year (2011) and 
has not gone as smoothly as planned. In particular, the controls that were operating 
effectively under the prior system for the revenue cycle needed to be re-built into the new 
system. Of particular concern to your department are controls related to the recording of 
revenue. Company policy requires that prior to the recognition of revenue, a matching 
process must be performed whereby the approved customer purchase order and shipping 
document are reviewed, matched, and approved by the billing manager.        
 
During the third quarter, as part of its annual audit plan, your Internal Audit Department 
performed a preliminary walk-through of the revenue cycle to assess fraud risk and 
control risk in preparation for year-end testing. During this walk-through and 
related testing, it was revealed that the control procedures (related to matching the 
purchase order and shipping document) had not been consistently documented or 
performed. In particular, your control testing revealed that 18% of the 200 sample items 
resulted in an exception (i.e., the proper documentation that the control was performed 
was missing or incomplete). These control deficiencies could lead to a material 
misstatement in the financial statements for the current fiscal year, 2011.     
 
When your staff made inquiries to the related management regarding these control 
deficiencies, they were told that “the conversion significantly impacted the operation, and 
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we did not have enough time to perform all of the procedures as we had done prior to the 
conversion. Our primary focus was to get the inventory shipped to the customers to meet 
their needs and work on the related paperwork later as time permitted.” They also 
responded that the CFO was aware of these issues and supported that approach.     
 
You are now considering the fraud risk and control risk related to this cycle and the 
time needed for testing in this cycle for the current year-end (2011) audit, given the 
situation described above.  
 
Q13   
 
Please answer the following questions in the order they are presented. 
 
 Unless otherwise indicated, you may refer back to the case materials when 
answering the questions.        
 Do not change your responses once they are recorded.  
Q14  
 
Based only on the information presented in the case materials, please slide the below bar 
to indicate your opinion as to the level of financial statement fraud risk associated with 
the revenue cycle for this fiscal year (0 represents low risk, 50 represents moderate risk, 
and 100 represents high risk). 
 
Sliding scale 0 to 100  
 
Q15 
 
Please briefly explain your rationale. 
 
Q16  
 
Based only on the information presented in the case materials, please slide the below bar 
to indicate your opinion as to the level of control risk associated with the revenue cycle 
for this fiscal year (0 represents low risk, 50 represents moderate risk, and 100 represents 
high risk). 
 
Sliding scale 0 to 100  
 
Q17  
 
Please briefly explain your rationale. 
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Q18  
 
Based only on the information presented in the case materials, please slide the below bar 
to indicate how many hours would you expect to spend on the revenue cycle control 
testing during the current year-end internal audit as compared to the prior fiscal year-end 
audit (-50 represents significantly fewer hours this year, 0 represents the same amount of 
hours, and 50 represents significantly more hours this year).  
 
Sliding scale -50 to 50  
 
Q19 
 
Based only on the information presented in the case materials, please slide the below bar 
to indicate how important it would be to justify to the Chief Financial Officer the audit 
hours you have budgeted to audit internal control over the revenue cycle (0 represents not 
at all important, 50 represents moderately important, and 100 represents very important).  
 
Sliding scale 0 to 100  
 
Q20  
 
Based only on the information presented in the case materials, please slide the below bar 
to indicate the experience level of the staff you would assign to the revenue cycle 
control testing for the current year-end internal audit as compared to the prior fiscal 
year-end audit (-50 represents significantly less experience this year, 0 represents the 
same amount of experience, and 50 represents significantly more experience this year).  
 
Sliding scale -50 to 50  
 
Q21  
 
Based only on the information presented in the case materials, please slide the below bar 
to indicate how comfortable you would be in reporting the preliminary internal control 
deficiency findings (18% exceptions) to the Chief Financial Officer (-50 represents very 
uncomfortable, 0 represents neutral, and 50 represents very comfortable).  
 
Sliding scale -50 to 50  
 
Q22  
 
Please answer the following questions without referring back to the prior screens. It is 
very important to not go back to prior screens. 
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Q23 – Manipulation Check – Reporting Relationship  
 
In this case, who most actively oversees the Internal Audit Department?  
 
 Chief Financial Officer (CFO)  
 
 Audit Committee Chair (ACC)  
Q24 – Manipulation Check – Report Type  
 
In this case, your Internal Audit Department produces the following voluntary (not 
required) reports to external stakeholders: 
 
 No reporting to external stakeholders – all internal audit reports are for internal use 
only.  
 
 An overall annual written report to external stakeholders that includes only 
descriptive information about the internal audit function.  
 An overall annual written report to external stakeholders that provides only positive 
assurance on the effectiveness of internal control in areas that have historically 
deemed to be material and of higher risk.  
 An overall annual written report to external stakeholders that includes both 
descriptive information about the internal audit function and provides positive 
assurance on the effectiveness of internal control in areas that have historically 
deemed to be material and of higher risk.  
Q25  
 
Please indicate by sliding the bar below, how realistic the case was in regards to the 
system conversion and related audit considerations (0 represents very unrealistic, 50 
represents moderately realistic, and 100 represents very realistic). 
 
Sliding scale 0 to 100  
 
Q26 
 
Please indicate by sliding the bar below, how understandable this case was (0 represents 
very difficult to understand, 50 represents moderately understandable, and 100 represents 
very understandable). 
 
Sliding scale 0 to 100  
 
Q27  
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Some have called for internal audit departments to provide an annual written report to 
external stakeholders that includes descriptive information about the internal audit 
function such as its composition, responsibilities, accountability, activities, and resources. 
Please indicate by sliding the bar below, your personal level of support for such an 
external report (0 represents no support, 50 represents moderate support, and 100 
represents full support). 
 
Sliding scale 0 to 100  
 
Q28  
 
Please explain your rationale.  
 
Q29    
 
Please indicate by sliding the bar below, how much you believe it would cost for your 
internal audit department to issue an annual report to external stakeholders that 
provides descriptive information about the internal audit function such as its 
composition, responsibilities, accountability, activities, and resources. (Please state the 
cost estimate as a percentage of your current total annual internal audit budget).   
 
Sliding scale 0% to 300%  
 
Q30  
 
Some have called for internal audit departments to provide an annual written report to 
external stakeholders that provides positive assurance on the effectiveness of internal 
control in areas that have historically deemed to be material and of higher risk. Please 
indicate by sliding the bar below, your personal level of support for such an external 
report (0 represents no support, 50 represents moderate support, and 100 represents full 
support). 
 
Sliding scale 0 to 100  
 
Q31  
 
Please explain your rationale. 
 
Q32   
 
Please indicate by sliding the bar below, how much you believe it would cost for your 
internal audit department to issue an annual report to external stakeholders that 
provides positive assurance on the effectiveness of internal control in areas that have 
historically deemed to be material and of higher risk. (Please state the cost estimate as a 
percentage of your current total annual internal audit budget).   
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Sliding scale 0% to 300% 
 
 
 
Q33   
 
The questions that follow are for classification purposes only.  No effort will be made to 
identify you based on the information you provide. 
 
Q34 
 
What is your gender? 
 
 Female  
 
 Male  
Q35  
 
Please provide your total years of professional business experience, including years as an 
internal auditor. 
 
 Less than 5 years 
  
 5 to 10 years  
 11 to 15 years  
 16 to 20 years  
 21 to 25 years  
 Over 25 years  
Q36 
 
Please provide your total years of professional experience as an internal auditor. 
 
 Less than 5 years  
 5 to 10 years  
 11 to 15 years  
 16 to 20 years  
 21 to 25 years  
 Over 25 years  
Q37  
 
Please provide your current title. 
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 Chief Audit Executive (or other equivalent title) (1) 
 Director of Internal Audit (2) 
 Manager of Internal Audit (3) 
 Accounting/Consulting Firm Partner (4) 
 Accounting/Consulting Firm Senior Manager (5) 
 Accounting/Consulting Firm Manager (6) 
 Other (please provide below) (7) ____________________ 
Q38  
 
Please indicate the segment(s) in which you currently work.  
 
 Consulting (1) 
 Government (2) 
 Public Accounting (3) 
 Public Company (4) 
 Private For-Profit Company (5) 
 Not-For-Profit (6) 
 Other (7) 
Q39  
 
Please indicate the approximate annual revenue of your employer. 
 
 Less than $10 million (1) 
 $10 million to $50 million (2) 
 $51 million to $100 million (3) 
 $101 million to $200 million (4) 
 $201 million to $300 million (5) 
 $301 million to $400 million (6) 
 $401 million to $500 million (7) 
 $501 million to $1 billion (8) 
 Over $1 billion (9) 
Q40 
 
Please indicate below any professional certifications that you hold (check all that apply). 
 
 CIA (1) 
 CFA (2) 
 CFE (3) 
 CMA (4) 
 CPA (5) 
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 I do not hold any of the above professional certifications (6) 
 
 
Q41  
 
Please indicate your educational status (check all that apply). 
 
 Undergraduate Degree in Accounting (1) 
 Other Undergraduate Degree (2) 
 MBA (3) 
 Masters in Accountancy (4) 
 Masters in Taxation (5) 
 Other Masters Degree (6) 
 Doctoral Degree in Accounting (7) 
 Other Doctoral Degree (8) 
Q42   
 
Please indicate by sliding the bar below, the degree to which management and the 
audit committee actively oversee the Internal Audit Department in 
your organization (0 represents oversight is provided almost exclusively by 
management, 50 represents equal oversight by management and the audit committee, and 
100 represents oversight is provided almost exclusively by the audit committee).   
 
Sliding scale 0 to 100  
 
Q43    
 
Please indicate by sliding the bar below, which group has the greatest influence over the 
determination of the Internal Audit Department’s budget in your organization (0 
represents it is almost exclusively influenced by management, 50 represents it is 
equally influenced by management and the audit committee, and 100 represents it 
is almost exclusively influenced by the audit committee).   
 
Sliding scale 0 to 100  
 
Q44  
 
If you have any additional thoughts about this case, write them here: 
 
Q45  
 
Thank you for completing the survey. 
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Your responses have been recorded and will remain strictly confidential.   If you would 
like to be entered in the $100 American Express gift certificate drawing and/or receive a 
summary report of the aggregate survey responses, please check the appropriate boxes 
below and provide an e-mail address where we may contact you for these purposes.   
(Your e-mail address will only be used for these purposes and will be disassociated from 
your survey responses.) 
 
 Please enter me in the $100 American Express gift certificate drawing. (12) 
 Please send me a summary report of the survey responses. (8) 
Q46  
 
Email address: 
 
 
 
